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CANADA’s HOMICIDE RATE 
RISES
In November, Statistics 
Canada released the 
homicide numbers for 
2017. Statistics show 
that Canada hit its 
highest homicide rate 
in almost a decade. In 
2017, police reported 660 homicide victims in 
Canada. This was an increase of 48 victims over 
2016. The homicide rate per 100,000 population 
was 1.80, up 7% from 2016 and the highest rate 
since 2009. 
The most substantial year-over-year increases 
occurred in BC (+30) and Quebec (+26). 
Saskatchewan (-17) and Ontario (-10) reported 
the largest declines.
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HOMICIDE VICTIMS BY YEAR
PROVINCIAL HOMICIDE VICTIMS  
Province 2017 2016 +/- % Change
BC 118 88 30 25.4%
QC 93 67 26 28.0%
NS 21 13 8 38.1%
MB 47 42 5 10.6%
NU 6 1 5 83.3%
YT 8 4 4 50.0%
AB 118 116 2 1.7%
PEI 0 0 0 0%
NB 10 11 -1 -10.0%
NWT 2 3 -1 -50.0%
NL 4 7 -3 -75.0%
ON 196 206 -10 -5.1%
SK 37 54 -17 -45.9%
More at p. 4
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Advanced Police Training
at the Justice Institute of BC
Looking to refresh or develop your current skills? 
The JIBC’s Advanced Training Program provides 
in-depth development opportunities for law 
enforcement officers. Some of our courses involve 
training in traditional and online investigations; 
patrol operations, as well as surveillance 
techniques and developing leadership skills. 
Sworn municipal officers, RCMP, peace officers, 
and other law enforcement officers (by approval) 
are encouraged to register. 
Upcoming Courses for 2019
General Investigative Skills @ Victoria 
Campus: January 14-18
Standard Field Sobriety Training @ New 
West Campus: January 21-24 or January 
28-31 or February 19-22
Search and Seizure @ Victoria Campus: 
February 4-8 
Critical Incident Manager @ New West 
Campus: February 4-15 
          
Drug Investigations @ New West Campus: 
February 11-15
Search and Seizure @ New West Campus: 
February 11-15
Advanced Police Training Contact Information
advancedpolicetraining@jibc.ca
604-528-5761
**2019 Course Calendar here** 
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
#Crime: social media, crime, and the criminal 
legal system.
Rebecca M. Hayes & Kate Luther.
Cham, SUI: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.
HM 742 H42 2018
Can I see your hands!: a guide to situational 
awareness, personal risk management, resilience 
and security.
Dr. Gavriel (Gav) Schneider; foreword by Dave 
Grossman.
Irvine, CA: Universal Publishers, 2017.
HV 7431 S353 2017
Communicating across cultures.
Stella Ting-Toomey & Tenzin Dorjee.
New York, NY: The Guilford Press, 2018.
GN 345.6 T56 2018
Drug-impaired driving in Canada.
Nathan Baker.
Toronto, ON: Irwin Law, 2018.
KE 2114 B34 2018
Effective SMEs: a trainer's guide for helping 
subject matter experts facilitate learning.
Dale Ludwig & Greg Owen-Boger.
Alexandria, VA: ATD Press, 2018.
HF 5549.5 T7 L765 2018
Forensic human factors and ergonomics: case 
studies and analysis.
Michael S. Wogalter.
Boca Raton, FL: Taylor & Francis, 2018.
T 55 W64 2018
Handbook of personality disorders: theory, 
research, and treatment.
edited by W. John Livesley, Roseann Larstone.
New York, NY: The Guilford Press, 2018.
RC 554 H36 2018
Interpersonal and group dynamics: a practical 
guide to building an effective team.
Daisy-Mae Hamelinck & Bruce Bjorkquist.
Toronto, ON: Emond, 2019.
HM 716 B56 2019
Leadership team coaching in practice: case 
studies on developing high-performing teams.
Peter Hawkins.
New York, NY: Kogan Page Ltd, 2018.
HD 66 H386 2018
Risk and hazard management for festivals and 
events.
Peter Wynn-Moylan.
Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2018.
GT 3935 W96 2018
Social media and crisis communication.
edited by Lucinda Austin & Yan Jin.
New York, NY: Routledge, 2018.
HM 742 S62 2018
Substance use disorders: a guide for the primary 
care provider.
H. Thomas Milhorn.
Cham, SUI: Springer, 2018.
RC 564 M55 2018
Training reinforcement: the 7 principles to create 
measurable behavior change and make learning 
stick.
Anthonie Wurth & Kees Wurth.
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2018.
HF 5549.5 T7 W87 2018
Uncrossing the wires: a guide to effective 
communication between media and emergency 
services.
Sarah Edmonds & Brian Ward.
Toronto, ON: Thomson Reuters Canada, 2018.
HV 551.5 C2 E366 2018      
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Homicide Rates
The Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) of Thunder 
Bay, ON had the highest homicide rate of all CMAs 
at 5.80 homicides per 100,000 people. This was 
followed by Abbotsford-Mission, BC (4.72), 
Edmonton, AB (3.40), Brantford, ON (3.36) and 
Regina, SK (3.15). The average CMA homicide rate 
was 1.63 while Canada’s overall rate was 1.80.
Gang-Related Homicides
Gang-related homicides rose to 163 in 2017, 
accounting for 25%  of all homicides, up 23 from 
2016. The largest increases of gang-related 
homicides occurred in BC (+15) and Alberta (+12). 
BC and Alberta numbers accounted for 47% of all 
gang-related homicides. 
BC had the highest proportion of gang-related 
homicides at 37.3%  of the province’s total. New 
Brunswick followed at 30.0%, Manitoba at 27.7% 
and Alberta at 27.1%.
HOMICIDE RATES - Select CMAs
CMA Rate Homicides
Thunder Bay, ON 5.80 7
Abbotsford-Mission, BC 4.72 9
Edmonton, AB 3.49 49
Brantford, ON 3.36 5
Regina, SK 3.15 8
Kelowna, BC 2.99 6
Winnipeg, MB 2.96 24
Barrie, ON 2.25 5
Calgary, AB 2.07 31
Vancouver, BC 2.02 52
All CMAs Total 1.63 422
All Non-CMA Total 2.20 238
Canada 1.80 660
US MURDER RATES- Select MSAs
MSA  
Metropolitan Statistical Area
Murder / 
Non-Negligent 
Manslaughter 
Rate
Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD 14.7
Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV 10.8
Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI 9.4
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-
DE-MD
8.1
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA 6.7
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX 6.4
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 5.7
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 5.2
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA 4.8
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO 4.6
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-
MD-WV
4.5
San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA 4.2
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 3.0
New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA 2.8
Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH 2.6
San Diego-Carlsbad, CA 2.4
Source: US data based on FBI UCR reporting [accessed December 21, 2018]
Rates per 100,000 inhabitants.
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GANG-RELATED HOMICIDES BY YEAR
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Firearm-Related Homicides
There were 266  firearm-related homicides reported 
in Canada in 2017, 43  more than in 2016. Firearm-
related homicides have been increasing since 2014 
with gang-related violence the primary driver. In 
2017, 52%  of firearm-related homicides were gang 
related. 
New Brunswick had the largest proportion of 
homicides committed with a firearm (55.6%) 
followed by BC (53.3%), Alberta (45.1%), Ontario 
(44.0%), and Nova Scotia (40.0%)
Other Methods of Death
Of the homicides in which a cause of death was 
identified in 2017, 41% of homicide victims were 
shot, 31% were stabbed, 17%  were beaten, and 
4% were strangled or suffocated. Other causes of 
death included shaken baby syndrome, fire (eg. 
smoke inhalation or burns) and by motor vehicle.
Source: Homicide in Canada, 2017. Juristat. Statistics Canada. 
Catalogue no. 85-002-X. https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/
85-002-x/2018001/article/54980-eng.htm [accessed December 21, 
2018]  
GANG-RELATED HOMICIDES BY PROVINCE/TERRITORY (2017)
Area BC AB SK MB ON QC NS NB NL PEI YK NWT NU
Number 44 32 5 13 48 15 1 3 0 0 2 0 0
% of 
Homicides
Gang-related
37.3 27.1 13.5 27.7 24.5 16.1 4.8 30.0 0 0 25.0 0 0
GANG-RELATED HOMICIDES by CMA
CMA Gang-Related % of 
Homicides
Abbotsford-Mission, BC 6 67%
Kelowna, BC 3 50%
Winnipeg, MB 11 46%
Thunder Bay, ON 3 43%
Toronto, ON 36 39%
Calgary, AB 12 39%
Vancouver, BC 19 37%
Montreal, QC 15 33%
Edmonton, AB 15 31%
Ottawa, ON 4 29%
Regina, SK 2 25%
Brantford, ON 1 20%
Oshawa, ON 1 20%
Victoria, BC 1 20%
Saskatoon, SK 1 20%
Hamilton, ON 1 9%
All CMAs Total 131 31%
Canada 163 25%
FIREARM-RELATED HOMICIDES BY TYPE
FIREARM TYPE Number
Handgun 145
Rifle or Shotgun 62
Sawed-off Rifle or Shotgun 22
Fully Automatic Firearm 2
Other Firearm-Type Unknown 34
Firearm-like Weapon
(such as nail guns, pellet guns, flare guns)
1
TOTAL 266
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Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Homicide Survey.
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CHANGE IN NUMBER OF HOMICIDES
Male
victims
74%
ABORIGINAL PEOPLE represented about 5% of Canada’s 
total population in 2017 yet accounted for a HIGHER 
PERCENTAGE of homicide VICTIMS and ACCUSED persons. 
Canada
660
+48
The RATE of gang-related 
homicides was UP for the 
3RD YEAR IN A ROW. 
HOMICIDES WERE 
GANG-RELATED.
24%
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38%
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<1%
ABORIGINAL NON-ABORIGINAL UNKNOWN
VICTIMS OF HOMICIDE PERSONS ACCUSED OF HOMICIDE 1
1 Totals exceed 100% due to rounding.
HOMICIDE RATES  for Canada's LARGEST CENSUS 
METROPOLITAN AREAS: 
1.11
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Rate per 100,000 population
2.02
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Female
victims
26%
There were 266 VICTIMS KILLED BY A FIREARM in 2017, 43 MORE than in 2016. This was the 
4TH consecutive increase in the number of firearm homicides and the HIGHEST RATE SINCE 1992. 
HANDGUNS accounted for about SIX IN TEN firearm homicides. 
SHOOTING STABBING BEATING ALL HOMICIDES1
1 Includes homicides committed by methods other than shooting, stabbing or beating.
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The homicide rate in 2017 increased by 7% from 
the previous year, reaching the HIGHEST RATE SINCE 2009.
1
32%
13%
17%
6%
31%
4 out of 5 victims of solved homicides KNEW THEIR KILLER.1
ACQUAINTANCE CRIMINAL
RELATIONSHIP
FAMILY MEMBER CURRENT OR
FORMER INTIMATE 
RELATIONSHIP
STRANGER
1 Figures do not add to 100% due to rounding.
Catalogue number: 11-627-M
ISBN number: 978-0-660-28451-4
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CO-HABITANT CANNOT WAIVE 
PRIVACY INTEREST IN 
COMPUTER
R. v. Reeves, 2018 SCC 56
The accused shared a home with his 
common law spouse. They were joint 
titleholders and had lived with their 
two daughters in this home for 10 
years. After being charged with a 
domestic  assault, a no-contact order was issued 
which prohibited the accused from visiting the 
family home without his spouse’s prior, written, and 
revocable consent. The spouse contacted the 
accused’s probation officer to withdraw her consent 
and also reported that she and her sister had found 
what they believed to be child pornography on the 
home computer a year earlier.
Later that day, a police officer arrived at the family 
home without a warrant. The spouse allowed the 
officer to enter the home and she signed a consent 
form authorizing the officer to take the computer, 
which was owned and used by both spouses. It was 
located in the basement, a shared space in the 
home. The accused was not at the  home but rather 
in custody on unrelated charges when the 
computer was taken by police. 
The police detained the computer without a 
warrant for more than four months, but did not 
search it during this time. They failed to report the 
seizure of the computer to a justice, as required by 
s. 489.1 of the Criminal Code, and eventually 
obtained a  warrant to search it. The police found 
140 images and 22 videos of child pornography on 
the computer and the accused was charged with 
possessing and accessing child pornography. 
Ontario Court of Justice
The officer testified that he sought the 
spouse’s consent because he did not 
believe he had reasonable grounds to 
obtain a warrant to search the home and 
seize  the computer. The judge found “the officer’s 
entry into a  private residence without the consent 
of both owners or occupants constituted a search 
of those premises for section 8 Charter purposes”. 
The judge concluded that the police breached the 
accused’s s. 8 Charter rights. First, the warrantless 
search of the home and seizure of the home 
computer was unreasonable. The accused had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the home and 
the computer, and did not consent to police 
entering  the home and removing the computer. 
Although the police obtained the spouse’s consent 
to enter the home and remove the computer, a third 
party  could not waive another’s  Charter  rights. 
S e c o n d , t h e p o l i c e f a i l e d t o c o m p l y 
with  the  Criminal Code  when they detained the 
computer for over four months without reporting its 
seizure to a justice. Third, the judge ruled the 
information to obtain (ITO) the search warrant was 
goal-oriented, misleading, unbalanced and unfair, 
and the search warrant should not have been 
granted. The computer evidence was excluded 
under s. 24(2) and the accused was acquitted.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The Court of Appeal did not 
agree with the trial judge that 
the police infringed s. 8 when 
they entered the home and 
took the  computer with the consent of the spouse. 
Although one resident cannot waive  the Charter 
rights of another, the  Court of Appeal found that co-
residency was relevant in assessing a claimant’s 
expectation of privacy. Here, the accused’s 
expectation of privacy in the shared spaces of the 
home and the  computer was “greatly diminished”. 
As a result, it was reasonable for the accused to 
expect that his common law spouse would be 
“able to consent to police entry into the common 
areas of the home or to the taking of the shared 
computer.”
And, although the Court of Appeal agreed that the 
continued detention of the computer and the 
subsequent computer search violated  s. 8  of 
the  Charter, the evidence should not have been 
excluded under s. 24(2). The Crown’s appeal from 
the accused’s acquittal was allowed, the 
exclusionary order was set aside, and a new trial 
was ordered.
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Supreme Court of Canada
A majority of 
the Supreme 
Court agreed 
with the trial 
judge that the 
police breached the accused’s s. 8 Charter  rights 
when they took the computer from the home. 
Although the computer was shared, the accused 
maintained a reasonable  expectation of privacy in 
it. And the common law spouse’s consent did not 
nullify the accused’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy, or operate to waive his Charter rights with 
respect to the computer. 
s. 8 Charter-Unreasonable Search or Seizure
The seven member majority articulated a number of 
principles concerning s. 8 of the Charter:
 
• “In assessing whether  s. 8  has been infringed, 
courts consider whether an individual’s privacy 
interests must give way to the state’s interest in 
law enforcement. The challenge of  s. 8  is that 
courts are most often called on to interpret its 
scope in cases, like this, where the police have 
found evidence that the claimant has engaged 
in criminal activity. Child pornography offences 
are serious and insidious, and there is a strong 
public interest in investigating and prosecuting 
them. However, in applying s. 8, the question is 
not whether the claimant broke the law, but 
rather whether the police exceeded the limits of 
the state’s authority.” [para. 2] 
• “The s. 8 analysis is geared towards determining 
‘whether in a particular situation the public’s 
interest in being left alone by government must 
give way to the government’s interest in 
intruding on the individual’s privacy in order to 
advance its goals, notably those of law 
enforcement’.” [para. 11]
• “Section 8 of the Charter is only engaged if the 
claimant has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the place or item that is inspected or 
taken by the state. To determine whether the 
claimant has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, courts examine ‘the totality of the 
circumstances’.” [references omitted, para. 12] 
• “The reasonable expectation of privacy standard 
is normative, rather than descriptive. The 
question is whether the privacy claim must ‘be 
recognized as beyond state intrusion absent 
constitutional justification if Canadian society is 
to remain a free, democratic and open society’. 
Further, the inquiry must be framed in neutral 
terms — ‘[t]he analysis turns on the privacy of 
the area or the thing being searched and the 
impact of the search on its target, not the legal 
o r i l l e g a l n a t u r e o f t h e i t e m s 
sought’.” [references omitted, para. 28]
• “There is a presumption that the taking of an 
item by the police without a warrant violates s. 
8  of the  Charter  unless the claimant has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the item or 
has waived his Charter rights.” [para. 27]
• “‘[T]he essence of a seizure under  s. 8  is the 
taking of a thing from a person by a public 
authority  without that person’s consent’. In 
contrast, valid consent acts as a waiver of the 
claimant’s s. 8 rights. In such cases, there is no 
search or seizure within the meaning of 
the  Charter, even though the claimant would 
ordinarily enjoy a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the thing the police have taken or 
inspected.” [references omitted, para. 13]
• “If s. 8 of the  Charter  is engaged, ‘the court 
must then determine whether the search or 
seizure was reasonable’. A warrantless search or 
seizure is presumptively unreasonable, and the 
Crown bears the burden of rebutting this 
presumption). A search or seizure is reasonable 
‘if it is authorized by law, if the law itself is 
reasonable and if the manner in which the 
search [or seizure] was carried out is 
reasonable’.” [references omitted, para. 14]
• “[B]ecause  someone  is always likely to have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a personal 
computer, the taking of a personal computer 
without a warrant and without valid consent 
will constitute a presumptively unreasonable 
seizure.” [para. 56]
“In assessing whether s. 8 has been infringed, courts consider whether an individual’s 
privacy interests must give way to the state’s interest in law enforcement.”
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Personal Computers
In recognizing the special 
privacy concerns that 
arise with the seizure and 
search of a computer, the 
majority stated:
Personal computers contain highly private 
information. Indeed, “[c]omputers often 
contain our most intimate correspondence. 
They contain the details of our financial, 
medical, and personal situations. They even 
reveal our specific interests, likes, and 
propensities”. Computers act as portals — 
providing access to information stored in many 
different locations. They “contain information 
that is automatically generated, often 
unbeknownst to the user”. They retain 
information that the user may think has been 
deleted. [references omitted, para. 34]
And further:
… [S]pecific, prior judicial authorization is 
required to search a computer ... . The unique 
and heightened privacy interests in personal 
computer data clearly warrant strong 
protection, such that specific, prior judicial 
authorization is presumptively required to seize 
a personal computer from a home. This 
presumptive rule fosters respect for the 
underlying purpose of  s. 8  of the  Charter  by 
encouraging the police to seek lawful authority, 
more accurately accords with the expectations 
of privacy Canadians attach to their use of 
personal home computers and encourages 
more predictable policing. [references omitted, 
para. 35]
In this case, the accused had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the  shared computer. In 
deciding so, on the basis of the “the totality of the 
circumstances”, the majority considered “(1) the 
subject matter of the alleged seizure; (2) whether 
the claimant had a direct interest in the subject 
matter; (3) whether the claimant had a  subjective 
expectation of privacy in the subject matter; and 
(4) whether this subjective expectation of privacy 
was objectively reasonable.”
The majority found the police were after more  than 
just the physical computer itself, but rather sought 
to preserve and permit access to the  data it 
contained. In seizing the computer, the police 
deprived the accused control over this highly 
private information, including the opportunity to 
delete it: 
Here, the subject matter of the seizure was the 
computer, and ultimately the data it contained 
about [the accused’s] usage, including the files 
he accessed, saved and deleted. I acknowledge 
that the police could not actually search the 
da ta un t i l they ob ta ined a war ran t . 
Nevertheless, while the privacy interests 
engaged by a seizure may be different from 
those engaged by a search, [the accused’s] 
informational privacy interests in the computer 
data were still implicated by the seizure of the 
computer. When police seize a computer, they 
not only deprive individuals of  control  over 
intimate data in which they have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, they also ensure that 
such data remains  preserved  and thus subject 
to potential future state inspection. 
[…]
[The accused] undoubtedly had a direct interest 
and subjective expectation of privacy in the 
home computer and the data it contained. He 
used the computer and stored personal data on 
it. The computer was password-protected. The 
threshold for establishing a subjective 
expectation of privacy is low.  
The final question is whether [the accused’s] 
subjective expectation of privacy was 
objectively reasonable.  Section 8  seeks to 
protect “a biographical core of personal 
information which individuals in a free and 
democratic society would wish to maintain and 
control from dissemination to the state”. 
“The unique and heightened privacy interests in personal computer data clearly warrant 
strong protection, such that specific, prior judicial authorization is presumptively 
required to seize a personal computer from a home.”
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Although a seizure of a computer may be less 
intrusive than a search of its contents, both 
engage important privacy interests when the 
purpose of the seizure is to gain access to the 
data on the computer. Privacy includes “control 
over, access to and use of information”. Thus, 
the personal or confidential nature of the data 
that is preserved and potentially available to 
police through the seizure of the computer is 
relevant in determining whether the claimant 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in it.  
[references omitted, paras. 30-33]
Finally, joint ownership and shared control over the 
computer was not determinative of whether the 
accused’s subjective expectation of privacy was 
objectively reasonable. “Shared control does not 
mean  no  control,” said Justice Karakatsanis. “By 
choosing to share a computer with others, people 
do not relinquish their right to be protected from 
the unreasonable seizure of it.” Furthermore, any 
lack of control over the personal computer by the 
accused was not voluntary. He was in custody 
when the computer was seized and restrained from 
accessing the house by court order. 
Warrantless Entry to the Shared Home 
The majority  refused to determine whether the 
police infringed the accused’s rights when they 
entered the shared home without a warrant. During 
his oral submissions, the accused submitted that the 
police entry  into his home was lawful and did not 
breach the Charter. As a result of this concession, 
the majority  found it was not necessary to decide 
whether the entry into the home constituted a 
discreet violation of the accused’s rights. Since the 
lawfulness of the computer’s seizure could be 
assessed without determining the legality of the 
police entry, the majority proceeded on the 
assumption that the entry was lawful.  Moreover, 
the majority wanted to wait until a later day where 
the issue had been fully argued before exploring 
whether police entry into a shared home on the 
consent of one resident violated the Charter.  “The 
issue of whether police entry into a shared home 
with the consent of one resident violates 
the Charter raises complex questions that require  a 
considered response,” said Justice  Karakatsanis 
speaking for the majority. “They are best answered 
in a case that directly turns on this issue, with the 
benefit of full submissions.”
Warrantless Taking of the Shared Computer 
I.  Criminal Code    
Because the officer testified he did 
not have reasonable  grounds to 
seize  the  computer, he could not 
seize  it without a warrant under the 
Criminal Code. The majority stated:
Even if the officer had lawfully been in the 
home, this would not make the seizure of the 
computer lawful. Section 489(2) of the Criminal 
Code  provides that a police officer “who 
is  lawfully present  in a place pursuant to a 
warrant or otherwise in the execution of duties 
may, without a warrant, seize any thing that the 
officer  believes on reasonable grounds” was 
used in the commission of an offence or would 
afford evidence of an offence. Here, however, 
this section was not available; the officer 
testified that he asked for [the spouse’s] consent 
to seize the computer  because  he did not 
believe he had grounds to obtain a warrant. 
Irrespective of whether the officer was “lawfully 
present” in the home, by his own admission, he 
did not have “reasonable grounds” to seize the 
computer.   [para. 21]
“Although a seizure of a computer may be less intrusive than a search of its contents, 
both engage important privacy interests when the purpose of the seizure is to gain 
access to the data on the computer.”
“Shared control does not 
mean no control. By choosing to share a 
computer with others, people do not 
relinquish their right to be protected from 
the unreasonable seizure of it.”
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II.  Consent     
The majority also rejected the 
Crown’s contention that the 
accused’s spouse, having  an 
equal and overlapping privacy 
interest in the computer, could 
consent to its removal and 
therefore its taking did not amount to a “seizure” 
under the Charter. Instead, the accused had  a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the computer 
when it was taken by the police and the accused’s 
spouse could not waive his Charter rights in it. 
Although it is reasonable to expect a  person may 
bear the risk that a  co-user of a shared computer 
may access data on it and even discuss the data 
with police, it is not reasonable that the person 
would expect the co-user could consent to the 
police taking the computer:
The consent of [the accused’s] spouse cannot 
nullify a reasonable expectation of privacy 
that he would otherwise have in the shared 
computer. Admittedly, when we share a 
computer with other people, we take the risk 
that they will access information we hoped to 
keep private. They may wish to share the 
information they find with others, including 
the police. But … the reasonable expectation 
of privacy standard is normative, not 
descriptive. The question is not which risks the 
claimant has taken, but which risks should be 
imposed on him in a free and democratic 
society. [para. 41]
And further:
I cannot accept that, by choosing to share our 
computers with friends and family, we are 
required to give up our  Charter  protection 
from state interference in our private lives. We 
are not required to accept that our friends and 
family can unilaterally authorize police to 
take things that we share. The decision to 
share with others does not come at such a 
high price in a free and democratic society. … 
[S]uch an approach to  s. 8  may also 
disproportionately impact the privacy rights of 
low income individuals, who may be more 
likely to share a home computer. [para. 44]
The accused’s spouse was free to notify the police 
about what she  saw on the computer, but her 
consent for the police to take the computer could 
not extinguish his reasonable expectation of 
privacy in it. Nor could the accused’s spouse 
waive his Charter  rights by giving her consent. 
“While [the  accused’s spouse] undoubtedly has 
constitutionally-protected privacy interests in the 
shared computer, this does not entitle her to 
relinquish  [the accused’s] constitutional right to 
be left alone,” said Justice Karakatsanis. “Waiver 
by one rights holder does not constitute waiver 
for all rights holders.” Since the accused had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the  shared 
computer and his rights had not been waived, its 
war ran t le s s se izure  was p resumpt ive ly 
unreasonable and the Crown offered no other 
common law or statutory basis for its taking.
Detaining the Computer and Searching It
The Crown conceded that the police  breached the 
accused’s  Charter  when they detained the 
computer and subsequently searched it.
s. 24(2) Admissibility
Despite society’s s t rong interest in the 
adjudication of this case on its merits given the 
evidence was reliable and important to the 
Crown’s case in prosecuting serious and insidious 
child pornography offences, the majority agreed 
with the trial judge that the evidence ought to 
have been excluded. First, the  Charter-infringing 
police conduct was serious. The police should 
have known better. “With respect to the  seizure 
of the shared computer, while the  officer 
believed that [the accused’s spouse’s] consent 
allowed him to take it, the police service  had a 
specialized cyber-crime unit that should have 
been aware  of the unique and heightened privacy 
interests in computers,” said the majority. “The 
“We are not required to accept that our 
friends and family can unilaterally 
authorize police to take things that we 
share. The decision to share with others 
does not come at such a high price in a 
free and democratic society.”
Volume 18 Issue 6 ~ November/December 2018
PAGE 12
unit also should have known that a third party 
cannot waive  another party’s  Charter  rights.”  The 
police could also not explain why they had 
detained the computer for months without 
complying with the  Criminal Code  reporting 
requirements. There were also problems with the 
ITO upon which the search warrant was obtained. 
Second, the police conduct had a serious impact 
on the  accused’s Charter-protected interests. The 
search and seizure of a personal computer is very 
intrusive given the extremely private nature of the 
data that a personal computer may contain.
The accused’s appeal was allowed, the  judgement 
of the Court of Appeal in ordering  a new trial was 
set aside, the evidence obtained from the seizure 
and subsequent search of the accused’s computer 
was excluded, and the acquittal entered at trial was 
restored. 
 
A Helping Hand?
Justice Moldaver, writing a separate 
opinion, substantially agreed with the 
majority’s  analysis and conclusion that 
the evidence should be excluded and 
the acquittal restored. However, unlike the majority 
he addressed the legality  of police entry into the 
shared residence by offering “a possible basis” for 
entry  under the common law ancillary powers 
doctrine. Accepting that the police entry into the 
common areas of the home infringed upon the 
accused’s reasonable expectation of privacy  and 
therefore amounted to a “search” under s. 8, Justice 
Moldaver explained that the common law ancillary 
powers doctrine could potentially  authorize the 
entry. The ancillary powers doctrine examines (1) 
whether the police conduct at issue fell within the 
general scope of their statutory or common law 
duties and (2) whether the conduct involved a 
justifiable  use of police powers associated with that 
duty. 
“[T]here can be no doubt that entering into a 
shared residence when invited to take a witness 
statement in connection with a  criminal 
investigation falls within the scope of police 
duties,”  said Justice Moldaver. “Investigating crime 
is a  primary police function. Police officers in 
Ontario are statutorily duty-bound to encourage 
crime prevention within the community, 
apprehend criminals, and assist victims of crime: 
Entering a home to take a witness statement in 
connection with a criminal investigation furthers 
all three of these mandates.” As for whether such 
entry  was justifiable, Justice Moldaver found it 
could be, provided police abide by the following 
five  constraints designed to minimize police 
interference into a persons expectation of privacy:
(1) The police must offer the authorizing 
resident, and any other cooperating 
occupants, a suitable alternative interview 
location — if one is available — that does 
not potentially intrude upon the reasonable 
expectations of privacy of co-residents in 
their home.
(2) The purpose of the entry must be limited to 
taking a statement, or statements, from the 
authorizing resident, or one or more willing 
occupants, in connection with a criminal 
investigation. The police may not go further 
and search for or seize evidence unless they 
obtain the necessary grounds to do so in the 
course of taking the statement or statements.
(3) The police are only permitted to enter the 
home’s common areas into which they have 
been invited.
(4) The police can only enter if invited in by a 
resident with the authority to consent and 
that consent must be voluntary, informed 
and continuous.
(5) Unless the police obtain the necessary 
grounds to take further investigative action, 
the duration of the entry must be limited to 
taking a statement, or statements, from the 
authorizing resident, or one or more willing 
occupants. [para. 96]
Despite proposing this power of entry, Justice 
Moldaver cautioned that it was merely  “tentative” 
and he was only assuming i t would be 
constitutional. None of the other judges offered an 
opinion on his proposal and Justice Moldaver said 
that “any final determination of whether police 
may lawfully enter a joint residence when invited 
by one of the occupants must be left for another 
day.”  
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Yet Another View
Justice Côté, unlike his colleagues, 
concluded that the police could both (1) 
lawfully enter common areas of a shared 
home with the consent of one cohabitant 
(and did not require  the unanimous consent of all 
persons who live in that home) and (2) could 
lawfully seize a jointly-owned computer (i.e., 
physically remove the computer, without searching 
its contents) when that computer is located in a 
common area of a shared home and one of the 
computer’s co-owners provides their consent.
“In my view, one cohabitant can validly  consent to 
a police entry into common areas of a shared 
residence, obviating the need for a warrant,”  said 
Justice Côté.  “The alternative rule  —  that the 
police  may enter the common areas of a shared 
home only if they  obtain consent from each and 
every person who lives there  —  is entirely 
unworkable. It also has no basis in our 
existing s. 8 jurisprudence as it pertains to physical 
spaces.” He continued:
[I]t is not objectively reasonable for a 
cohabitant, who shares a residence with others, 
to expect to be able to veto another 
cohabitant’s decision to allow the police to 
enter any areas of that home that they share 
equally.  Although [the accused] did have an 
expectation of privacy in those areas, that 
expectation was attenuated and limited by the 
reality of cohabitation.  Other persons with 
overlapping privacy interests in and rights to 
common spaces can validly permit third parties 
to enter those spaces.  This includes the 
police. To hold otherwise would be to interfere 
with the consenting cohabitant’s liberty and 
autonomy interests with respect to those 
spaces. Thus, I would reject the argument that 
the entry was invalid because [the accused’s 
spouse] could not waive [the accused’s] 
Charter  rights. That is beside the point.  
Properly understood, [the accused’s spouse] did 
not waive anyone’s rights except her own. But 
in the context of a shared home, [the accused’s] 
reasonable expectation of privacy was not 
sufficiently capacious to afford constitutional 
protection against a cohabitant’s decision to 
give the police access to common areas. This is 
especially true on the facts of this case, where 
[the accused] had no legal right to be in the 
home at the time of the police entry because 
[the accused’s spouse] had revoked her 
permission for him to enter it earlier that day 
pursuant to the no-contact order. The analysis is 
of course different concerning private areas of a 
shared residence, such as an individual’s 
exclusive bedroom or office —  types of spaces 
that are not involved in this case. [para. 112]
And further:
The effect of [the accuse’s] position —  that the 
police must obtain the unanimous consent of 
all cohabitants before entering common 
areas — is unworkable and would substantially 
undermine effective law enforcement.  It would 
require the police to identify, locate and obtain 
the consent of every person who lives in the 
home, or has any expectation of privacy with 
respect to common areas of the home, no 
matter how onerous that task might be.  This 
would effectively negate all investigative 
advantages of entering on the basis of consent.  
In some cases, it would tip off potential 
suspects to an investigation.  In others, it would 
likely render consent entries too burdensome or 
impractical.  The police would be forced to 
obtain a warrant, rather than entering on the 
basis of consent, in all but the most 
straightforward of circumstances, creating 
additional procedural burdens.  The rule might 
also result in entries or searches that are more 
extensive (and therefore more invasive of 
privacy interests) than consent searches, which 
must be limited in accordance with the scope 
of the consent. And, of course, warrants require 
a sufficient evidentiary basis. In some instances, 
a suspect who cohabitates with others may 
wish to consent to a police entry or a search, 
even where a warrant could not otherwise be 
obtained, in order to quickly dispel suspicion 
or for other reasons. But under [the accused’s] 
proposed approach, any other cohabitant could 
veto that suspect’s ability to do so.  In fact, a 
cohabitant could even be precluded from 
permitting the police to search his or her own 
bedroom — one that is completely private and 
not shared with others  —  if accessing that 
bedroom would require entering shared areas 
of the home. [para. 114]
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Any consent, though, must be:
1. informed and voluntary;
2. given by a person having the authority  to 
consent; and 
3. limited to shared places or things. Further, the 
police must respect the limits of the consent, 
which can be revoked at any time.  
As for the taking of the computer, Justice Côté 
stated:
If instead of what happened here, [the 
accused’s spouse] had physically taken the 
computer to a police station and turned it over, 
surely the police would not have been 
prohibited from accepting it.  There is no 
coherent way to distinguish that scenario, on 
constitutional grounds, from a situation where 
the police request consent to physically remove 
jointly owned property and that consent is 
subsequently provided.  Regardless, it is 
important to be precise about the privacy 
interests that are implicated by a  seizure  of a 
computer as opposed to a  search  of its 
contents.  Much of the majority’s analysis 
focuses on informational privacy concerns that 
simply do not arise when the police physically 
remove an electronic device from a home 
without searching its contents.  [para. 106]
Despite finding the entry into the home and the 
seizure of the computer to be lawful, Justice Côté 
would nevertheless also exclude the evidence on 
the basis of the police failure to comply  with  the 
Criminal Code reporting requirements, the 
improper detention of the computer and the search 
warrant’s invalidity. 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.ca
Note-able Quote
“Character cannot be developed in ease and 
quiet. Only through experience of trial and 
suffering can the soul be strengthened, vision 
cleared, ambition inspired and success 
achieved.”
Helen Keller
INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION 
MUST BE ‘BRIEF’: 80 MINUTE 
DETENTION ARBITRARY 
R. v. Barclay, 2018 ONCA 114
Pol ice received a t ip f rom a 
confidential informer that a VIA train 
passenger was bound for Washago, 
ON from Vancouver, BC. He was 
ticketed under the accused’s name 
and had two large  black suitcases from which the 
informer said he could smell an odour of 
marijuana. The informer described the passenger as 
a bearded man around 35 years old, 5’10”, 175 
pounds, and wearing a beige “Duck Dynasty” cap. 
The  informer added that the passenger “was 
supposed to be getting off at Washago but is now 
getting off at Parry Sound, Ontario.”
Acting on the tip, the police placed the accused 
(who closely matched the description provided by 
the confidential informer) under investigative 
detention as he disembarked from the train in Parry 
Sound with two large black suitcases. Police 
suspected, based on the tip, that the suitcases 
contained marijuana, but they smelled nothing. The 
police did not believe they had grounds to arrest 
the accused. After reading the accused his rights 
and allowing him to make telephone calls from the 
police car, a drug-sniffing dog was summoned. The 
nearest dog was 90 km away. While they waited for 
the dog to arrive, the police took the accused and 
his luggage to the police station so he could use a 
washroom and access a landline telephone.
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The dog arrived about 105 minutes after the police 
first detained the accused. The dog made a 
“positive hit” on one of the suitcases and the 
accused’s duffle bag. The police arrested him and 
found 33 pounds of marijuana in his luggage with a 
street value of between $174,000 and $350,000.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The judge concluded that the length of 
time that the accused was detained 
pending  the  deployment of the dog was 
reasonable in the circumstances. 
“Canada is a  large country comprised of many 
small towns which are spread out over great 
distances,” he  said. “It is not feasible for each of 
the detachments in these small towns to maintain 
their own sniffer dogs, and in the  circumstances a 
delay of a little less than 2 hours was not 
unreasonable.” The accused was convicted of 
possessing marihuana for the purpose of trafficking 
and breach of probation. He was sentenced to 12 
months imprisonment. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued that his 
lengthy investigative  detention, 
along with his luggage, fell 
outside the permissible scope of 
the common law police power of investigative 
detention. Although the accused conceded that the 
police were entitled to initially detain him and his 
luggage for investigative purposes based on the tip, 
he submitted that the resulting 105 minute 
detention was simply too long. 
The Court of Appeal agreed and found the police, 
based only on a suspicion, were not entitled to 
detain the accused and his luggage for the time 
they did until the arrival of a drug sniffing dog. 
Thus, the detention of the accused and his luggage 
was arbitrary and violated s. 9 of the Charter. 
“[T]he requirement that an investigative detention be ‘brief’ nonetheless connotes a 
temporal limitation and not a period that can be extended for as long as necessary to 
further an otherwise appropriate, diligent, and legitimate investigation of the particular 
crime to which the individual is suspected of being connected.”
CHRONOLOGY
7:33 am Police receive a tip from a confidential informer
7:40 am The confidential informer’s tip was relayed to the 
police in Parry Sound.
8:50 am VIA train expected to arrive in Parry Sound
9:14 am VIA train arrived in Parry Sound. The accused 
disembarked from the train. After verifying his name, 
the police detained him, cautioned him, and advised 
him of his right to counsel. 
9:27 am The police performed a frisk search of the accused “for 
police safety” before putting him in the police vehicle. 
The accused was in the police vehicle, sheltered from 
the light rain and wind, making an initial telephone 
call on his cell phone. The police put the accused’s 
luggage in the trunk of their vehicle and left the trunk 
lid open. Two more police officers arrived. None of the 
officers detected an odour of marijuana coming from 
the bags, even when one of the officers placed his face  
close to the bags.
9:37 am  The accused concluded his initial call.
9:40 am The police requested the closest drug-sniffer dog. They 
expected that it would take 30-45 minutes for the dog 
to arrive.
9:57 am The police took the accused to the detachment so that 
he could use the washroom and call his counsel from 
the detachment’s landline. 
10:00 am The police and accused arrived at the detachment and 
police placed the accused’s luggage in a small room.
10:06 am The accused was on the phone with counsel. He was 
not “locked up” at the detachment, but he was not free to leave. He waited in an interview room.
10:58 am The sniffer dog arrived and the police moved the 
accused’s luggage to the larger garage area.
11:02 am The dog sniffed the accused’s luggage and indicated 
that one suitcase and the accused’s duffle bag had an 
odour of drugs. The accused was arrested and the 
police searched the contents of the accused’s luggage.
Source: R. v. Barclay, 2016 ONSC 2811
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Prolonged Detention
Under s. 9 of the  Charter, 
everyone has the right not 
to be arbitrarily detained. 
A detention will not be 
arbitrary if it is lawful. 
Under the common law, 
the police may detain a 
person for investigation “if 
there are reasonable 
grounds to suspect in all 
the circumstances that the individual is connected 
to a  particular crime and that such detention is 
necessary.”  The investigative detention, however, 
must be “brief in duration”  and conducted in a 
reasonable manner. “If the police conduct in 
detaining the  [accused] amounted to a lawful 
exercise of their common law powers, then the 
investigative detention was not arbitrary, and did 
not violate  the suspect’s right under s. 9 of 
the Charter,”  said Associate  Chief Justice Hoy. “On 
the other hand, if the police conduct fell outside 
the scope of these powers, it constituted an 
infringement of the [accused’s] right under s. 9 not 
to be arbitrarily detained.”
The Appeal Court rejected the Crown’s contention 
that the common law empowers police to detain an 
individual for as long as reasonably necessary to 
further the investigation of the particular crime to 
which the individual is suspected of being 
connected:
 
[T]here is no bright line temporal rule in 
determining whether an investigative detention 
involved an unjustifiable use of police powers 
and, as a result, is arbitrary. However, the 
requirement that an investigative detention be 
“brief” nonetheless connotes a temporal 
limitation and not a period that can be 
extended for as long as necessary to further an 
otherwise appropriate, diligent, and legitimate 
investigation of the particular crime to which 
the individual is suspected of being connected. 
It follows that the permitted duration of an 
investigative detention is not defined by the 
time reasonably required to deploy a sniffer 
dog, even if the police treatment of the suspect 
is otherwise exemplary during the period of 
detention. 
The permitted duration of an investigative 
detention is determined by considering whether 
the interference with the suspect’s liberty 
interest by his continuing detention was more 
intrusive than was reasonably necessary to 
perform the officer’s duty, having particular 
regard to the seriousness of the risk to public or 
individual safety.  
But all investigative detentions must be “brief” 
because the state interference with the 
individual’s liberty rests on a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity, a much lower 
standard than the reasonable and probable 
grounds needed for an arrest. The relatively low 
“reasonable suspicion” standard cannot 
constitutionally sustain a detention that is not 
“brief”.  
The pu rpo se o f t he b r i e f de t en t i on 
contemplated under the investigative detention 
power is to allow the police to take 
investigative steps that are readily at hand to 
confirm their suspicion and arrest the suspect 
“The purpose of the brief detention contemplated under the investigative detention 
power is to allow the police to take investigative steps that are readily at hand to confirm 
their suspicion and arrest the suspect or, if the suspicion is not confirmed, release the 
suspect.”
“The word ‘brief’ is descriptive and not 
quantitative. It describes a range of time 
and not a precise time limit. The range, 
however, has temporal limits and cannot 
expand indefinitely to accommodate any 
length of time required by the police to 
reasonably and expeditiously carry out a 
police investigation.”
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or, if the suspicion is not confirmed, release the 
suspect.  
 
The word “brief” is descriptive and not 
quantitative. It describes a range of time and 
not a precise time limit. The range, however, 
has temporal limits and cannot expand 
indefinitely to accommodate any length of time 
required by the police to reasonably and 
expeditiously carry out a police investigation.  
The permitted duration of an investigative 
detention is case-specific. Some of the relevant 
factors include:
• the intrusiveness of the detention. For 
example, handcuffing the suspect behind 
his or her back and placing the suspect in a 
police cruiser, or diverting the suspect from 
his intended path by taking him to the 
police detachment to continue the 
investigation, will generally be more 
intrusive of the suspect’s liberty interest than 
asking him questions at the point of initial 
detention. The more intrusive the detention 
is to the suspect’s liberty interest, the more 
closely its duration will be scrutinized.
• the nature of the suspected criminal 
offence. If the suspected offense is not 
serious, the permitted duration will 
probably be at the shorter end of “brief”.
• the complexity of the investigation. If the 
investigation is not complex, one would 
expect that police questioning of the suspect 
would not reasonably need to be lengthy, 
and the permitted duration will probably be 
at the shorter end of “brief”. However, if the 
investigation of the suspected criminal 
offence is complex, its complexity will only 
justify a longer permitted duration within 
the range of “brief” to the extent it is 
causally linked to the duration of the 
detention.
• any immediate public or individual safety 
concerns. Immediate public or individual 
safety concerns may justify a permitted 
duration at the longer end of “brief”.
• the ability of the police to effectively carry 
out the investigation without continuing 
the detention of the suspect. If there are 
other reasonable means of continuing the 
investigation without detaining the suspect, 
the continued detention of the suspect 
would likely render continued detention 
unconstitutional.
• the lack of police diligence. For example, if 
a sniffer dog were immediately available, 
and yet the police detained the suspect for 
20 minutes before employing the dog to 
confirm or refute their suspicion, then, 
depending on all of the other relevant 
factors, the interference with the suspect’s 
liberty interest as a result of the lack of 
police diligence might render the delay  
unconstitutional.
• the lack of immediate availability of the 
required investigative tools. On the other 
hand, depending on all of the other relevant 
factors, if a sniffer dog were made available 
as soon as practicable and employed as 
soon as available, the same 20-minute 
detention might fall within the range of time 
that can be characterized as a “brief” 
detention.
The relative importance of these and other 
relevant factors, and thus the permissible length 
of an investigative detention, will vary from 
case to case. But it is crucial to remember that 
such factors merely situate the permitted 
duration of the detention within the range of 
what is “brief”, and that all investigative 
detentions must be “brief”. [references omitted, 
paras. 26-32]
In this case, the Appeal Court concluded that the 
lawful investigative detention of the  accused and 
his luggage had ended by no later than 9:40 a.m. 
“By that time, the police had completed their 
investigation at the VIA station,” said Associate 
Chief Justice  Hoy. “Their investigation had yielded 
“If there are other reasonable means of continuing the investigation without detaining the 
suspect, the continued detention of the suspect would likely render continued detention 
unconstitutional.”
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nothing: four police officers had been unable to 
detect any odour of marijuana emanating from the 
[accused’s] luggage and they believed that it would 
take 35-40 minutes for a sniffer dog to arrive.” He 
continued:
 
The further interference with the [accused’s] 
liberty interest by his continued detention while 
police awaited the arrival of the drug-sniffer 
dog was more intrusive than was reasonably 
necessary to address the seriousness of the risk 
to public or individual safety and to perform 
the police duty, given the nature of the offence. 
The police suspected that the [accused] had 
marijuana in his luggage. The investigation was 
not complex and, in this situation, the risk to 
public or individual safety was low. If the 
police had wanted to continue investigating the 
[accused], they knew where he lived and, in 
the circumstances, had numerous avenues they 
could have pursued without interfering with his 
liberty.
Arrest?
The Crown contended the 
police objectively had the 
reasonable grounds necessary 
to arrest the accused and 
search his luggage when he 
disembarked from the train with the  two suitcases 
based on the “totality of the circumstances”, 
including the confidential informer’s tip. In the 
Crown’s view, the police  were entitled to arrest the 
accused and therefore “brief” could be interpreted 
liberally. 
The Court of Appeal rejected this submission as 
well. In order to justify an arrest without warrant, 
the police require reasonable  grounds, both 
subjectively and objectively. Here, however, the 
police did not subjectively think they had 
reasonable grounds to arrest the accused based 
solely on the confidential informer’s tip. Thus, the 
police were not entitled to arrest him, and there 
was no basis to interpret “brief” in the broad 
manner that the Crown proposed. 
Further, the  Appeal Court did not agree that the 
objective grounds for arrest were met:
Although the confidential informant suspected 
criminal activity, the confidential informant had 
no inside information. The [accused’s] tip was 
not that the suitcases contained marijuana. The 
confidential informant gave only one reason for 
suspecting the [accused] of criminal activity, 
namely that the [accused’s] suitcases had the 
odour of marijuana. The sense of smell is highly 
subjective. There was no indication that the 
confidential informant had special, or even 
reliable, olfactory powers or special training or 
experience in detecting the odour of marijuana. 
While information from this confidential 
informant had led to the arrest and subsequent 
conviction of another individual for possession 
of marijuana, there was is no evidence that this 
information was based on the confidential 
informant’s ability to smell marijuana. In all of 
the circumstances, the tip was not sufficiently 
compelling to provide reasonable and probable 
grounds to arrest the [accused]. Although the 
police had reasonable grounds to suspect that 
the [accused] had marijuana in his luggage 
when they detained him, objectively, they did 
not have reasonable and probable grounds to 
believe that he had committed an offence. 
[reference omitted, para. 36]
Evidence Admissibility
Although the accused’s right 
against arbitrary detention had 
been violated, the evidence was 
nonetheless admitted. First, the 
seriousness of the police conduct 
that led to the breach was at the 
low end of the spectrum. The 
Charter breach was not wilful or 
reckless. Moreover, other than 
exceeding the permissible 
duration of the detention, the 
police respected the accused’s 
rights during his detention. Second, although the 
length of detention had a reasonably serious impact 
on the accused’s Charter-protected rights (detained 
“Immediate public or individual safety 
concerns may justify a permitted duration 
at the longer end of ‘brief’.”
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about 80 minutes longer than was permissible), he 
was not “locked up” and the dog sniff search, in 
and of itself, was minimally invasive. Finally, the 
drug evidence was both reliable and critical to the 
charge, and the offence was moderately  serious. 
Society had an interest in an adjudication of the 
case on its merits.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s note: Additional facts taken from R. v. 
Barclay, 2016 ONSC 2811.
NO s. 10(b) BREACH IN UN-
ELICITED & SPONTANEOUS 
INCRIMINATING STATEMENT 
R. v. Miller, 2018 ONCA 942 
 
The accused, who operated a 
motorcycle business, returned to 
Canada from the United States 
driving a truck that was carrying 
several motorcycles. After a sniffer 
dog detected the presence of drugs in the truck, 
Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) officers 
detained the accused and his passenger on 
suspicion of smuggling. He was handcuffed, 
informally cautioned and advised of his right to 
counsel. He stated that he did not wish to speak to 
counsel. Within several minutes of his detention, a 
CBSA officer took  the accused into a search room, 
removed his handcuffs and formally read him his 
rights from a prepared card. When asked if he 
wished to speak to a lawyer the accused again 
answered no.  
The CBSA officers then conducted a thorough 
search of the  truck and located 105 bricks of 
cocaine weighing a total of 100 kg. One of the 
agents then advised the accused that he was under 
arrest for smuggling. He was again read the 
standard caution and advice regarding his right to 
counsel, but the accused began to speak. The CBSA 
officer stopped him and told him to wait until he 
was properly advised of his rights. When advised of 
his right to counsel, the accused responded that he 
would like to contact a lawyer. 
The CBSA officer then completed reading the 
caution and, immediately  after doing so, the 
accused began to speak without being prompted or 
questioned.  The accused said there  were “100 keys 
of coke” in the bed of the truck. He also asked to 
retrieve a cell phone from the truck so that he 
could send a coded message. He also wanted his 
wallet so he could get his lawyer’s phone number. 
The accused indicated that there could be a safety 
issue with his family and that he  wished to 
cooperate  with the investigation and provide the 
authorities with information. He also asked that the 
truck be moved so that it could not be seen and 
offered to complete the delivery so the officers 
could identify who received the drugs. He told the 
officers that he had brought this shipment because 
of a business downturn.  The officers asked 
questions to clarify  what the accused was saying. 
Some 52 minutes elapsed after he made his 
statement but before he was afforded an 
opportunity to speak to counsel. Part of this time 
was taken to facilitate  smoking and toilet breaks for 
the accused.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The judge found that the accused “was 
repeatedly given his rights to counsel 
and appropriately cautioned as his 
jeopardy changed”. Furthermore, when 
the accused interrupted the CBSA officers as they 
read him his rights, “he was not diligent in 
pursuing speaking with counsel”. Rather, he was 
more concerned with his own safety, the movement 
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of the truck, and the retrieval of a cell phone than 
with speaking with counsel. Since there was no s. 
10(b) breach, there was no need to consider the 
exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2). The accused 
was convicted of importing cocaine and possessing 
cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued that his s. 
10(b) Charter rights were 
b r e a c h e d a n d t h e 
incriminating statement he 
made to the CBSA officers effectively  admitting 
knowledge that he was importing cocaine was 
obtained as a result of that violation. Although he 
conceded that the officers were under no legal duty 
to stop him from making his spontaneous 
statement, he argued that the 52 minute delay after 
he made it but before he was afforded access to a 
telephone to contact counsel constituted a  breach 
of his s. 10(b) right. And since no causal 
relationship need be shown between a  Charter 
breach and the incriminating statement for that 
statement to be “obtained in a  manner” that 
infringed s. 10(b), the statement ought to have been 
excluded under s. 24(2).
Right to Counsel
The Ontario Court of Appeal found the trial judge 
erred in characterizing the situation as one where 
the accused was not diligent in exercising his s. 
10(b) right to speak with counsel. This was not a 
case where the accused was advised of his right to 
counsel, given an opportunity and the means to 
speak with counsel, and failed to pursue that right 
in a timely manner. Instead, the Appeal Court 
described what happened this way:
In our view, what occurred may be more 
accurately described as follows: immediately 
upon being fully informed of his right to 
counsel for the third time, the [accused] made 
a spontaneous and unprompted incriminating 
statement. As this court has held, if a detainee 
makes an un-elicited and spontaneous 
i n c r i m i n a t i n g s t a t e m e n t a f t e r b e i n g 
appropriately cautioned, there is no violation of 
s. 10(b). 
As we have noted, the [accused] attempted to 
speak while he was being cautioned. The CBSA 
agent made him stop so that the agent could 
ensure that the [accused] was properly 
cautioned and advised of his right to counsel. It 
is clear on the record that once he had been 
read his rights, the [accused] immediately 
launched into making a statement. There is no 
evidence that the CBSA agents began to 
question or interrogate the [accused] before he 
made his statement. On the voir dire … [the 
accused] unequivocally described his statement 
as being spontaneous. …. In our view, the 
[accused’s] evidence supports a conclusion that 
his statement was a spontaneous utterance 
made with full knowledge of his right to remain 
silent and speak to counsel. [reference omitted, 
paras. 14-15]
Although it was recognized that the officers were 
under a  duty to refrain from eliciting any 
incriminating evidence from the accused until he 
had been given a reasonable opportunity to contact 
a lawyer or unequivocally waived his right to do so, 
the Court of Appeal concluded that even if the 
clarifying questions and the 52 minute delay in 
making it possible  for the accused to speak  to 
counsel was a  Charter breach and impugned the 
prior spontaneous statement, the statement was 
nonetheless admissible under s. 24(2).  Any breach 
in this case was not serious; the  impact on the 
accused’s rights was at the lowest end of the 
spectrum; and society’s interest in an adjudication 
of the case on the merits clearly  favoured 
admission. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
“[I]f a detainee makes an un-elicited and spontaneous incriminating statement after 
being appropriately cautioned, there is no violation of s. 10(b).”
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THROWING KEYS AWAY 
ABANDONS PRIVACY INTEREST: 
NO s. 8 BREACH
R. v. Tran, 2018 ONCA 964
As a result of a report from a Hydro 
emp loyee o f h i gh e l ec t r i c a l 
consumption and a hydro by-pass at 
a residence, the police  conducted 
surveillance and subsequently 
obtained a. s. 487 Criminal Code search warrant to 
enter the residence in relation to theft of electricity. 
While conducting surveillance and prior to 
executing the search warrant, police officers 
observed the accused, identified as one of the 
targets, drive to the residence and then exit a 
vehicle in the driveway. 
As an officer exited his police 
vehicle and approached, the 
accused discarded some keys 
by tossing them onto the front 
lawn of the home. The officer 
picked up the keys and asked 
the accused whether there were 
any other people  in the house. He responded 
“no”. The accused was immediately arrested and a 
marihuana grow operation was found in the house.  
The keys the accused threw away were for the 
residence. The  accused was charged with various 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act offences and 
theft of electricity under the Criminal Code. 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused sought to exclude the keys 
that he tossed and which were seized by 
the police during the  events in the 
driveway of the residence. He argued, 
among other things, that he had been unreasonably 
searched contrary to s. 8 of the Charter. The Crown, 
on the other hand, submitted there was no search 
as the accused effectively abandoned his keys by 
tossing them away prior to his arrest. The judge 
agreed with the Crown, holding the  keys were 
abandoned. This abandonment defeated the 
reasonable expectation of privacy standing that the 
accused needed to establish a s. 8 Charter breach. 
“I find on the evidence that upon the abrupt 
arrival of the police at the driveway of the 
residence, the [accused] reacted and discarded his 
keys to the ground and therefore abandoned 
them,”  said the judge. “Thus, there is no search 
and no violation of his s. 8 Charter rights.”  
Ontario Court of Appeal
 
The accused challenged the 
credibility findings made by 
the trial judge in concluding 
that he “threw” his house and 
car keys on the ground when approached by the 
police. But the  Court of Appeal refused to accede 
to the accused’s argument. It its view, the trial judge 
gave ample, cogent reasons for believing that the 
accused tossed his keys, rather than them being 
taken from his pocket by police or being directed to 
drop them. The Appeal Court rejected the accused’s 
challenge to the trial judge’s s. 8 ruling and 
dismissed the appeal. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s note: Additional facts taken from R. v. 
Tran, 2015 ONSC 3907.
NEW BC POLICE COMPLAINT 
COMMISSIONER 
RECOMMENDED
The Special Committee to Appoint a Police 
Complaint Commissioner has unanimously agreed 
to recommend to the BC Legislative Assembly that 
Mr. Clayton Pecknold be appointed as BC’s Police 
Complaint Commissioner. “Committee Members 
were impressed by Clayton Pecknold’s leadership, 
personal integrity and commitment to public 
service”, said the report recommending his 
appoin tment .“The Commit tee noted h i s 
professional background in both law and policing, 
and his valuable experience in working 
respectfully and effectively with a range of 
policing, civil liberties, and other stakeholder and 
community organizations. They especially 
recognized his strong ethics and values, and his 
progressive vision for policing and public 
accountability.”
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REASONABLE GROUNDS NOT 
TO BE SUBJECT TO PIECEMEAL 
ANALYSIS
R. v. Palmer, 2018 ONCA 974
At 14:00 hours a Peel Regional 
Police officer received a tip from a 
confidential informer that “Sean” 
would be leaving a specific address, 
known to be a crack  house, with 
crack cocaine to sell. Sean would be carrying the 
cocaine in his rectum and would probably leave on 
foot. The only drug dealer the officer was aware of 
in the area with the nickname Sean was the 
accused.  
Shortly after receiving the tip, police  attended the 
address, and waited in their parked car. Within 10 
minutes of their arrival, the accused left the address 
on foot. He was arrested for possession for the 
purpose of trafficking at 16:25 hours and patted 
down.  Police  found a two-and-a-half inch folding 
knife concealed under his shirt at his waist. The 
accused was then arrested for carrying a concealed 
weapon and taken to the station. He was booked, 
and police took a cell phone from his backpack 
and money from his pocket. The money included 
three  $5 bills with dye on them that were part of 
the “bait” money taken during an armed bank 
robbery that took place the day  before. A strip 
search was also done but no drugs were found.
After the strip search, police did a CPIC check and 
learned the accused was a person of interest to the 
Toronto Police Service on charges involving an 
armed robbery of a TD Canada Trust bank the day 
before. During the robbery, two men entered the 
bank, one armed with a gun. They took bags of 
marked money and, when confronted by a 
customer, a shot was fired and an employee  was 
struck by a bullet. The robbers then fled the bank 
pursued by the customer, who was also shot. The 
robbers subsequently fled in a stolen vehicle.
Toronto police officers attended the Peel Regional 
police station and arrested the accused for the 
robbery after he  was released on a PTA in relation 
to the carrying a  concealed weapon charge. As a 
result of the drug arrest, the  accused was also found 
in possession a cell phone with a number that, with 
the help of a production order, police were 
subsequently able to place near the robbery  and 
where  the  stolen vehicle was located, and which 
communicated with another phone 13 times before 
and after the robbery. The man who owned the 
other phone pleaded guilty to his participation in 
the armed robbery.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused argued, among other 
things, that the three  $5 bait money 
bills, his cell phone, and his cell phone 
number and any information derived 
therefrom ought to be  excluded as evidence under 
s. 24(2) of the Charter because his rights were 
infringed. He submitted, in part, that the police did 
not have reasonable grounds to arrest him for 
possessing drugs for the  purpose of trafficking. 
Although he agreed that the arresting officer had 
the necessary subjective grounds, he suggested the 
grounds were not objectively reasonable. In his 
view, the information imparted by the confidential 
informer was unreliable: it was not compelling, 
credible, or corroborated. Since there were no 
reasonable grounds to arrest, the pat down search 
incident to his arrest was unreasonable.
 
Citing R. v. Debot, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140, the judge 
went on to hold that the officer’s grounds for 
believing the person coming out of the address was 
in possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking 
were objective reasonable. This included the 
cumulative effect of:
Andre Palmer vaulting the TD Canada Trust bank’s counter during robbery.
Source: Toronto Police Service
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• the information supplied by the confidential 
informer (including the  nickname, address, 
specific drug, location of the drug on his body, 
and mode of transportation);
• the freshness of the tip (which creates concern 
to preserve the evidence); 
• the arresting officer’s reasonable belief that he 
knew the target was the accused;
• the arresting officer’s reasonable belief that the 
address was a crack house; and 
• police observation of the accused leaving the 
building on foot (which corroborates the 
informer’s assertion that the target would leave 
on foot).
Having found the arrest lawful, the judge 
concluded the pat down search was incident to 
arrest to find evidence of drugs or drug 
paraphernalia. This led the police to discover a 
folding knife with a  two-and-a-half inch blade 
hidden at the accused’s waist underneath his shirt. 
Taking him to the police  station for a  strip search 
was also justified (police believed he had drugs in 
his rectum) and holding him for the hour spent to 
investigate whether he was wanted on other 
charges and to coordinate his arrest by  the Toronto 
Police on the robbery charges did not render the 
detention arbitrary. The accused was convicted of 
robbery x 2, aggravated assault x 2 and discharging 
a firearm with intent to wound x 2. 
Ontario Court of Appeal 
The accused challenged his 
convictions contending that 
his initial arrest on the charges 
unrelated to the robbery was 
not based on reasonable  grounds. Therefore, the 
evidence obtained from that unrelated arrest 
linking him to the bank robbery, including the bait 
money, should have been excluded because it was 
the product of a constitutional infringement. 
The Arrest 
Since the accused acknowledged 
that the arresting officer had the 
necessary  subjective grounds to 
arrest him, the only issue 
remaining was whether objective 
reasonable grounds existed.  Here, the Court of 
Appeal found the trial judge applied the proper 
legal standard and did not misapprehend any 
evidence material in reaching her conclusion: 
We approach this decision mindful that the trial 
judge need only have been satisfied that the 
grounds for arrest were objectively reasonable 
in the circumstances known to the officer at 
that time. The benchmark is a reasonable 
person standing in the shoes of the officer at 
the time of arrest with the officer’s knowledge, 
the officer’s experience and the officer’s 
training. It is that person who must be able to 
conclude that the grounds existed. And this 
conclusion must take into account all the 
circumstances known to the officer, a 
determination that eschews piecemeal analysis 
and microscopic scrutiny of individual items 
shorn of their context. 
In our assessment, we are mindful of the fact 
that little is known about the informant’s 
background or reliability. That said, the 
information provided was current and specific 
about place; about type; about storage of drug; 
and about method of transportation. In 
addition, this [accused] was known as a drug 
dealer. The only one who used the name 
“Sean”. And the place described from which he 
“The benchmark is a reasonable person standing in the shoes of the officer at the time of 
arrest with the officer’s knowledge, the officer’s experience and the officer’s training. It is 
that person who must be able to conclude that the grounds existed. And this conclusion 
must take into account all the circumstances known to the officer, a determination that 
eschews piecemeal analysis and microscopic scrutiny of individual items shorn of their 
context.”
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was leaving was a known crack house. While 
the officer could not supply information about 
the antecedents and reliability of the 
confidential informer, it is commonplace that 
the Debot factors are not mandatory conditions 
precedent to permit reliance on confidential 
informer information in support of search or 
arrest authority. Further, deficiencies in one 
factor may be compensated by strengths in 
others. [paras. 15-16]
The Appeal Court concluded that the arrest was 
based on reasonable grounds and therefore was not 
arbitrary. Since the arrest was not constitutionally 
infirm, there was no need to assess the admissibility 
of the evidence under s. 24(2). 
The accused’s conviction appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s note: Additional facts taken from R. v. 
Palmer, 2016 ONSC 153.
K9 TRACKING EVIDENCE 
ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE 
IDENTITY
R. v. Griffith, 2018 ONCA 875
Between 2:09 am and 2:12 am, two 
men, one us ing an apparent 
handgun, robbed a  taxi driver. The 
robbers fled toward a partially frozen 
river. Police responded quickly to the 
taxi driver’s call for help and spotted the accused at 
2:20 am on the other side of the river. He matched 
the general description of one of the robbers. The 
accused ran away from the police and jumped over 
a series of fences into the  backyards of houses. A 
tracking dog was used and the accused was caught 
at 2:22 am and arrested. Police noticed his boots, 
socks and pant legs were drenched with water.
The tracking dog was then taken to the scene of the 
robbery. He found a scent trail, which led from the 
area of the robbery to the edge of the river, and 
then from the opposite bank to where the accused 
had first been spotted by police. There were also 
footprints in the snow that went in the same 
direction as the accused’s scent trail and a  replica 
handgun resembling the one used in the robbery 
was found in the snow a few steps away from those 
footprints.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The judge found the accused guilty of 
robbery and using an imitation firearm in 
the commission of the  offence. The judge 
admitted the tracking evidence of the 
dog handler to help prove identity of the accused 
as the robber. She stated:
For the purposes of the admissibility of the 
evidence, I believe that [the dog handler] has 
particularly highlighted the success rate, not 
within the field but within the testing and the 
recertification of the higher standard by London 
Police Services. So for the admissibility, per se, 
I will allow it. Of course, then, there is cross-
examination with respect to the evidence itself 
that will go to the issue of weight and what I 
apply to it. So I will allow the evidence to be 
admitted.
In convicting the accused, the judge went on to 
say:
So based on the totality of the evidence, the 
timeline, the description of the perpetrator, the 
direct evidence of flight from police and 
jumping fences, the firearm being found in the 
locality where the accused was seen running, 
the evidence from [the dog handler of the 
tracking dog’s] dialed-in scent of a fresh human 
scent can only be rationally and logically be 
inferred that it was the accused who robbed 
[the taxi driver] and walked with his 
accomplice westbound on Ann Street, as [the 
taxi driver] saw them do, and then ran down 
toward the river. At that point, there is no 
evidence of where and how the gun got across 
the river, except that the accused was seen 
running in that same area before he was 
apprehended. I have no reasonable doubt that 
the accused is one of the perpetrators in the 
robbery and is a party to the offence of using an 
imitation firearm with his accomplice. 
The accused was sentenced to six months’ 
incarceration for the robbery  offence  and 12 
months’ consecutive for using a firearm.
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Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his 
convictions arguing, among 
other things, that the trial 
judge erred by admitting and 
relying on the dog tracking evidence. In his view, 
the tracking dog’s test and certification scores were 
not enough to warrant admission of the evidence 
related to the dog’s role  in the apprehension of the 
accused. Instead, more was needed such as 
evidence related to the tracking dog’s performance 
in actual cases.
The Court of Appeal, however, rejected this 
argument:
In our view, the preconditions for admissibility 
were met in this case. [The dog] had been a 
tracking dog for three years. He received 
extensive training and evaluation throughout 
the three year period. The standard he reached 
and maintained was the London Police Service 
standard which is even higher than the 
provincial standard. [The dog handler] had logs 
and statistics for all the training [the dog] had 
done. {the dog] was always successful in 
tracking scenarios. Indeed, during the relevant 
period, [the handler] led the unit in statistics, 
including the time he spent with [the dog]. 
Finally, [the handler] gave detailed evidence 
about [the dog’s] performance in this case. 
These factors, taken together, easily make the 
evidence relating to [the dog’s] tracking in this 
case admissible … [reference omitted, para. 9]
The Appeal Court was also unconvinced that the 
trial judge erred in admitting the accused’s flight 
from police  as post-offence conduct, rather than 
considering other possible  explanations for the 
flight such as an irrational or alcohol induced fear. 
But the defence offered no evidence on this issue. 
“As the trial judge said, ‘there is no evidence of 
fear of police’,” noted the Court of Appeal. “The 
only  reasonable inference in all of the 
circumstances was that the [accused] was fleeing 
the robbery, to avoid being implicated in it.”
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
CRIMINAL CODE SEARCH 
WARRANTS OK EVEN THOUGH
INCOME TAX ACT WARRANT 
AVAILABLE 
R. v. Watts, 2018 ONCA 148
The accused was under investigation 
by the Canada Revenue Agency 
(CRA) for fraud. The fraud involved 
preparation of tax returns for 241 
taxpayers . As a resu l t , CRA 
investigators obtained s. 487 Criminal Code search 
warrants from a judge of the Ontario Court of 
Justice to search various premises including those 
connected to the accused. As a result, the  CRA 
seized various computers and documents. 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused made an application for an 
order quashing the search warrants 
issued to the  CRA and for the return of 
the materials seized. The accused 
submitted, in part, that the CRA should have 
obtained the warrants under the Income Tax Act 
rather than the Criminal Code. The judge, however, 
rejected this argument and dismissed the accused’s 
application. “While it would have been open to the 
CRA to obtain search warrants under either 
statute,” said the judge, “there can be no serious 
issue raised that Criminal Code search warrants 
were obtained when a criminal offence is alleged.” 
The accused was subsequently convicted of fraud 
by a jury.  
Ontario Court of Appeal 
The accused appealed his 
conviction again objecting that 
the CRA obtained  Criminal 
Code  search warrants, rather 
than search warrants under the Income Tax Act. The 
Court of Appeal, however, agreed with the Superior 
Court judge’s decision to dismiss the accused’s 
application for an order quashing the search 
warrants. As the Appeal Court noted, there was 
nothing to add to the lower court’s analysis. The 
accused’s conviction appeal was dismissed.
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Supreme Court of Canada
The accused sought leave to appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Canada, but the application was dismissed 
([2018] S.C.C.A. No. 208).
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
POLICE MUST TURN THEIR 
MINDS TO SPECIFICS WHEN 
DELAYING ACCESS TO COUNSEL
R. v. Rover, 2018 ONCA 745
                                                                                                                      
Police received an anonymous tip of 
drug dealing from a residence. They 
made observations of traffic at the 
residence and arrested a woman seen 
leaving. On arrest, the woman 
admitted to buying drugs at the residence. Police 
decided they had reasonable grounds to arrest the 
occupant of the home, who turned out to be the 
accused, and obtain a warrant to search 
it.  However, for safety reasons, the police  did not 
want to arrest the accused in his residence. So, 
when he left the home later that evening he was 
then arrested. He was advised of his right to 
counsel and immediately indicated he wished to 
speak to a  lawyer. But he was not permitted to do 
so, nor was he told why he was not being allowed 
or when he would be allowed to speak with 
counsel. The accused was not questioned during 
the period he was denied access to a lawyer. Early 
the next morning, after police obtained and 
executed a search warrant at the residence, drugs 
were found. The accused was charged with various 
drug-related offences, including  trafficking cocaine 
and possession for the purpose of trafficking. 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused submitted, among other 
things, that the police breached his s. 
10(b) Charter right to counsel when they 
did not immediately give  him access to a 
lawyer upon request. In his opinion, the  drugs 
seized from his residence should have been 
excluded under s. 24(2). For their part, various 
police officers testified that it was “customary” or 
“standard” practice for the  police not to allow an 
arrestee to speak with counsel until after a search 
warrant was executed.
Although a detainee who asserts their right to 
counsel is entitled to contact counsel without delay, 
the judge noted that in some circumstances safety 
or evidence preservation concerns may justify a 
delay in allowing access to counsel. Here, the 
judge found that a search of a suspected drug 
dealer’s residence engaged sufficient concerns 
about safety and the preservation of evidence that 
some delay in providing the accused with counsel 
was justified. The judge found the delay between 
the arrest and the securing of the residence (four 
hours and 20 minutes) was justified. However, the 
delay after the residence was secured until the 
accused was told he could call a lawyer (80 
minutes) was not justified. 
The judge then conducted a s. 24(2) analysis in 
relation to the 80 minute breach, and admitted the 
evidence. The accused was convicted on three 
counts of possessing different drugs, including 
fentanyl, for the purpose of trafficking. He was 
sentenced to 20 months on top of credit for 3 and 
1/2 years of pre-trial custody.
CHRONOLOGY
8:45 pm woman arrested after leaving residence
10:33 pm accused leaves residence
10:41 pm accused arrested, advised of right to counsel and 
asserted desire to speak with lawyer.
12:50 am police receive signed telewarrant
2:55 am police enter and secure residence
3:01 am police begin search
4:20 am police make decision to allow accused to contact counsel
5:45 am accused actually speaks to lawyer.
Source: R. v. Rover, 2016 ONSC 4795
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Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused challenged his 
conviction arguing, in part, 
that the s. 10(b) breach began 
when he asserted his right to 
counsel and was not given the opportunity to speak 
with a lawyer. He suggested that the police refusal 
to allow him to speak to counsel was not 
precipitated by anything specific to the police 
investigation, but was the direct consequence of a 
police practice in denying access to counsel until 
the search of his home was completed. Further, he 
opined that the  breach of his s. 10(b) right was 
made all the more serious because it resulted from 
a police practice of routinely denying immediate 
access to counsel in favour of the police efficiently 
using its resources. 
s. 10(b) Right to Counsel
Justice Doherty, delivering the  unanimous Appeal 
Court decision, described the s. 10(b) right and 
whether a delay or suspension of the right to 
counsel is justified this way:
Section 10(b) of the  Charter  guarantees to 
anyone arrested or detained the right “to retain 
and instruct counsel  without delay and to be 
informed of that right” (emphasis added).
Section 10(b) obliges the police to advise a 
detained person of the right to speak with 
counsel without delay and, if the detained 
person exercises that right, the police must 
immediately provide the detainee with a 
reasonable opportunity to speak to counsel.
The s. 10(b) jurisprudence has, however, always 
recognized that specific circumstances may 
justify some delay in providing a detainee 
access to counsel. Those circumstances often 
relate to police safety, public safety, or the 
preservation of evidence. …
These cases have, however, emphasized that 
concerns of a general or non-specific nature 
applicable to virtually any search cannot justify 
delaying access to counsel. The police may 
delay access only after turning their mind to the 
specifics of the circumstances and concluding, 
on some reasonable basis, that police or public 
safety, or the need to preserve evidence, 
justifies some delay in granting access to 
counsel. Even when those circumstances exist, 
the police must also take reasonable steps to 
minimize the delay in granting access to 
counsel. [references omitted, paras. 24-27]
Put another way, the police  must conduct a case by 
case assessment of whether the circumstances 
justify  any delay in suspending the right to counsel. 
Here, Justice Doherty  found the police, having 
chosen to arrest the accused before they obtained 
the search warrant, were not  entitled to delay the 
right to speak to counsel for several hours while 
they applied for, obtained, and executed the 
warrant:
[T]he evidence demonstrates that the officers 
involved in this investigation followed a 
practice that routinely prevented arrested 
persons from accessing counsel if the police 
“[C]oncerns of a general or non-specific nature applicable to virtually any search cannot 
justify delaying access to counsel. The police may delay access only after turning their 
mind to the specifics of the circumstances and concluding, on some reasonable basis, 
that police or public safety, or the need to preserve evidence, justifies some delay in 
granting access to counsel. Even when those circumstances exist, the police must also 
take reasonable steps to minimize the delay in granting access to counsel.”
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intended to obtain a warrant to search a place 
for drugs and believed that the place had a 
connection to the arrested person. The rationale 
behind this practice appears to be that there is 
always a possibility that allowing an arrested 
person to speak to their lawyer could put the 
officers executing the warrant at risk or 
jeopardize the preservation of evidence. Under 
this practice, the [accused], as the occupier of 
the place to be searched, was prevented from 
contacting his lawyer, as were the two women 
who had been arrested earlier that evening. 
[para. 29]
And further:
The police practice described by the officers 
replaces the narrow, case-specific exception to 
the constitutional right to speak to counsel 
without delay upon arrest with a protocol that 
routinely delays an arrested person’s access to 
counsel for an indeterminate time, usually 
hours, whenever the police, for whatever 
reason, deem it appropriate to arrest them 
before applying for a search warrant.  There is 
no evidence that any of the officers turned their 
mind to the specific circumstances of this case 
before deciding that the [accused] would be 
arrested and denied access to counsel for 
several hours while the police sought, 
obtained, and executed a search warrant. On 
the evidence of the police, there was no need 
to consider the specifics of this case. For them, 
the decision to arrest the [accused] before 
seeking the search warrant dictated that the 
[accused] would not be allowed to contact a 
lawyer until the warrant was executed.
In my view, to fall within the exception to the 
requirement that an arrested person be allowed 
to speak to counsel without delay, the police 
must actually turn their mind to the specific 
circumstances of the case, and they must have 
reasonable grounds to justify the delay. The 
justification may be premised on the risk of the 
destruction of evidence, public safety, police 
safety, or some other urgent or dangerous 
circumstance. Furthermore, if the police 
determine that some delay in allowing an 
arrested person to speak to counsel is justified 
to permit execution of the warrant, then they 
must consider whether it is necessary to arrest 
the individual before they execute the warrant. 
The police cannot create a justification for 
delaying access to counsel by choosing, for 
reasons of convenience or efficiency, to arrest 
an individual before seeking, obtaining, and 
executing a search warrant. Police efficiency 
and convenience cannot justify delaying an 
arrested person’s right to speak with counsel for 
several hours. 
The effective implementation of the right to 
counsel guaranteed by s. 10(b) depends entirely 
on the police. The police must understand that 
right and be willing to facilitate contact with 
counsel. The practice under which the officers 
involved in this case operated demonstrates a 
disregard of a fundamental constitutional right. 
The [accused’s] right to speak with counsel was 
denied at the time of his arrest, when the police 
refused his request to speak with counsel. 
[paras. 32-34]
Thus, the unconstitutional delay was not a  mere 80 
minutes as the trial judge held, but rather almost six 
hours (calculated from the time of the accused’s 
arrest until the police decided to allow him to 
contact counsel).
s. 24(2) Charter
Although there was no causal connection between 
the discovery  of the drugs and the s. 10(b) breach, 
Justice Doherty found there was a close temporal 
connection sufficient to engage s. 24(2). And, even 
though the drug evidence was reliable evidence 
crucial to the Crown’s prosecution of a serious 
crime and excluding it would “allow a  guilty 
“[T]o fall within the exception to the requirement that an arrested person be allowed to 
speak to counsel without delay, the police must actually turn their mind to the specific 
circumstances of the case, and they must have reasonable grounds to justify the delay. 
The justification may be premised on the risk of the destruction of evidence, public 
safety, police safety, or some other urgent or dangerous circumstance.”
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person go free”, the Court of Appeal nevertheless 
excluded the evidence.
First, the police misconduct was very serious.  The 
police never turned their mind to the actual need to 
delay the accused’s access to counsel and showed 
no interest in mitigating the delay. “Constitutional 
breaches that are the direct result of systemic or 
institutional police practices must render the 
police  conduct more serious for the  purposes of 
the s. 24(2) analysis,” said Justice Doherty. “A 
police practice that is inconsistent with the 
demands of the  Charter produces repeated and 
ongoing constitutional violations that must, in the 
long run, negatively impact the due administration 
of justice. This is so even if many of the breaches 
are never exposed in a criminal court. … A police 
prac t i ce tha t rout ine ly ho lds de ta ined 
individuals  incommunicado  while the police go 
about obtaining and executing a search warrant 
must, over time, bring the administration of justice 
into disrepute.”
Second, the near six  hour unconstitutional delay in 
allowing the accused to speak to his lawyer had a 
significant impact on his Charter-protected interests 
even though the police  did not attempt to question 
him:
The right to counsel is a lifeline for detained 
persons. Through that lifeline, detained persons 
obtain, not only legal advice and guidance 
about the procedures to which they will be 
subjected, but also the sense that they are not 
entirely at the mercy of the police while 
detained. The psychological value of access to 
counsel without delay should not be 
underestimated.
In this case, instead of providing the[accused] 
with the lifeline to counsel when he requested 
it, the police put him in the cells. The [accused] 
was  held for several hours  without any 
explanation for the police refusal of access to 
counsel, and without any indication of when 
he might be allowed to speak to someone. His 
right to security of the person was clearly 
compromised. The significant psychological 
pressure brought to bear on the [accused] by 
holding him without explanation and access to 
counsel for hours must be considered in 
evaluating the harm done to his  Charter-
protected interests. [paras. 45-46]
The accused’s appeal was allowed, his convictions 
were quashed and acquittals were entered.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s note: Additional facts taken from R. v. 
Rover, 2016 ONSC 479. 
“Constitutional breaches that are the direct result of systemic or institutional police 
practices must render the police conduct more serious for the purposes of the s. 24(2) 
analysis. A police practice that is inconsistent with the demands of the Charter produces 
repeated and ongoing constitutional violations that must, in the long run, negatively 
impact the due administration of justice. This is so even if many of the breaches are never 
exposed in a criminal court.”
“A police practice that routinely holds 
detained individuals incommunicado while 
the police go about obtaining and 
executing a search warrant must, over 
time, bring the administration of justice 
into disrepute.”
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NO CONDITIONS AVAILABLE ON 
s. 810.1 CC APPLICATION BY 
SUMMONS
R. v. Nowazek, 2018 YKCA 12
The accused was summonsed to 
Yukon Territorial Court to appear on a 
s. 810.1 Criminal Code (fear of sexual 
offence) application. He denied any 
wrongdoing and was granted an 
adjournment to retain a lawyer. Crown then sought 
an order requiring the accused enter into an interim 
recognizance pending the s. 810.1 hearing. Citing 
public safety concerns, the judge granted the 
Crown’s request and ordered that the accused enter 
into a recognizance with a number of conditions. 
These conditions included a prohibition from 
accessing or possessing child pornography, and 
required the accused to allow the police access to 
his home for the purposes of ensuring his 
compliance with the recognizance. 
After the accused was released, he went directly 
home and found police waiting  for him. The police 
told the accused they were going to search his 
residence “as per the recognizance”. The police 
were allowed into the home and they searched 
several computers, including a laptop which had a 
browser history reflecting visits to child 
pornography websites. The accused was arrested for 
child pornography offences under s. 163.1 of the 
Criminal Code. The police then obtained a search 
warrant, the ITO of which included the browser 
history on the accused’s laptop. Upon execution of 
the warrant, police found child pornography, 
prohibited firearms, ammunition and explosive 
substances. The accused was charged with 
accessing child pornography, possessing child 
pornography, possessing explosive substances, and 
various other firearms-related offences.
Yukon Supreme Court
At trial the Crown conceded that the 
accused did not consent to the search 
nor did the police have sufficient 
grounds to obtain a  search warrant 
before conducting the search purportedly 
authorized by the recognizance condition. The 
accused, however, argued there was no jurisdiction 
to impose an interim recognizance on him because 
he appeared in court in response  to a  summons. 
And, even if a recognizance could be imposed, the 
accused submitted that its conditions exceeded the 
scope of what was permissible under s. 810.1. He 
contended his rights under ss. 7 and 8 of the 
Charter were breached and the evidence ought to 
have been excluded.
The judge found there was no jurisdiction to 
impose an interim recognizance on the accused 
pending  resolution of the s. 810.1 application 
because he had appeared in response to a 
summons. Instead, a person must be arrested and 
taken before a judge before an order can be made 
releasing that person on a recognizance with 
conditions. As a result, the interim recognizance 
order was invalid. 
IMPUGNED CONDITIONS
Condition 8: “You are prohibited from the 
possession, purchase or viewing of any pornographic 
materials featuring or having any reference to 
children.”
Condition 9: “You are not to possess any computer, 
computer software or computer peripherals such as an 
internet enabled cell phone or any other devices 
capable of downloading pictures from the internet, 
except as their mobile numbers, IP addresses, 
usernames and passwords are provided to [named 
police officer] or his designate. You must also provide 
to [named police officer] written releases sufficient to 
authorize any service provider to disclose your usage 
information and records to [named police officer].”
Condition 10: “You shall allow your Bail Supervisor 
or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police access to your 
home to ensure your compliance with the conditions of 
this order.” 
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The judge also went on to hold that, even if an 
interim recognizance order could be imposed on a 
defendant summoned to court in response to an 
application made under s. 810.1, conditions 
requiring a defendant to submit to searches of their 
home and personal computer fell outside the scope 
of the conditions authorized by s. 810.1(3.02). The 
information relied on to obtain the warrant derived 
f rom the ev idence ga thered dur ing  the 
recognizance compliance search of the accused’s 
home and personal computers was excised from 
the ITO. Once excised, there was no basis upon 
which the  search warrant could have issued. The 
warrant was quashed and the second search 
therefore breached s.  8  of the Charter.  The judge 
excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) and acquittals 
on all charges were entered.
Yukon Court of Appeal
The Crown argued that the 
trial judge erred in finding that 
the court had no jurisdiction 
t o i m p o s e a n i n t e r i m 
recognizance on the accused pending resolution of 
the s. 810.1  hearing because he appeared in 
response to a summons. The Crown also submitted 
that the trial judge erred in holding the  search 
conditions went beyond the type of conditions 
authorized by  s.  810.1. In the Crown’s view, the 
police search did not breach s. 8 of the Charter and 
the evidence should not have been excluded under 
s. 24(2).
Jurisdiction
After reviewing the 
legislative scheme at 
the time the interim 
recognizance order 
was imposed and the 
relevant case  law, the Court of Appeal found the 
trial judge correctly concluded that the lower court 
had no jurisdiction to impose an interim 
recognizance on the  accused. “In my view, a judge 
cannot apply the judicial interim release provisions 
in s. 515 to a  defendant who appears in response 
to a summons in s. 810.1 proceedings,”  said Justice 
Fitch, writing the unanimous judgement. “Section 
515 is triggered when an accused is ‘taken before 
a justice’. A summoned defendant is neither in 
custody nor ‘taken before a justice’.”  
If, however, a defendant is arrested on a warrant to 
compel appearance on a s. 810.1 application and 
taken before a justice, s. 515 governs their release 
pending  the hearing of the Crown’s application for 
a recognizance. As Justice Fitch noted:
If the integrity of the proceedings, including 
protection of the public, demands that a 
defendant in s. 810.1 proceedings be detained 
or subject to conditions of release pending the 
hearing of the Crown’s application for a 
recognizance, the police must seek a warrant 
for the person’s arrest. A summons does not 
trigger the s.  515 judicial interim release 
regime. [para. 97]
And further:
Turning to this case, I conclude that the 
Territorial Court judge lacked jurisdiction to 
impose an interim recognizance on [the 
accused] pending the hearing of the s.  810.1 
application. If imposing restrictions on [the 
accused’s] liberty was necessary to preserve the 
integrity of the s. 810.1 proceedings (because, 
for example, he posed an imminent risk to 
children), the police could have sought an 
arrest warrant. It is unclear to me why they did 
not do so. Given [the accused’s] history and the 
conduct motivating the application, it is likely 
that an arrest warrant would have issued had 
one been sought. 
“[W]en the police swear an information under s. 810.1(1), they have two choices. The first 
is to seek a summons. The second is to seek an arrest warrant. In this case, the police 
opted for the former route. As a result, it was not open to the Crown to invoke the 
judicial interim release regime when [the accused] appeared in response to the 
summons.”
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It must be recalled that, at the relevant time, 
[the accused] was an untreated sexual offender 
who was, by his own admission, unable to 
control his deviant sexual impulses. In 2009, 
he was determined to be a high risk to reoffend, 
particularly in relation to children. The 
evidence supplied overwhelming grounds for 
concern that [the accused] was attempting to 
befriend children with offers of candy and other 
gifts. The children he approached appear to 
have been complete strangers to him. There 
was a considerable body of evidence in this 
case that the defendant posed an imminent risk 
to the safety of children.
In summary, when the police swear an 
information under s.  810.1(1), they have two 
choices. The first is to seek a summons. The 
second is to seek an arrest warrant. In this case, 
the police opted for the former route. As a 
result, it was not open to the Crown to invoke 
the judicial interim release regime when [the 
accused] appeared in response to the 
summons. [paras. 103-105]
The Court of Appeal also recognized there may be 
cases where, on first appearance, a defendant may 
seek an adjournment of the  s. 810.1 recognizance 
application to retain counsel. If a defendant was 
summonsed it could be  that an unanticipated delay 
in the hearing due to an adjournment may put the 
community at risk if the defendant was released 
without judicially imposed conditions. To fill this 
public interest gap, Justice Fitch suggested that 
s. 512 would allow the judge to issue a  warrant for 
the defendant’s arrest at that time despite the fact 
that a summons had been previously issued.
The Recognizance Conditions
Even if conditions could have been imposed on the 
accused through an interim recognizance pending 
the s.  810.1 hearing, the Court of Appeal would 
have concluded that the conditions allowing the 
police to enter and search his home and computer 
went beyond the conditions that could be 
au thor ized by  s .  810.1 (3 .02) when the 
recognizance was imposed:
[T]he open-ended language of the residual 
power in s. 810.1(3.02) cannot be relied on to 
override the regular scheme for search warrants 
in relation to a defendant’s home or personal 
computer. To find otherwise would allow police 
to circumvent the requirement for a search 
warrant, as the police did in this case. This 
would subject a defendant in proceedings of 
this kind to different standards than those set by 
Parliament for the issuance of a search warrant. 
Establishing  Charter-compliant standards for 
searches of an individual’s home and personal 
computer must be left to Parliament, not to the 
discretion of judges in individual cases. 
If the police suspect that a defendant is 
committing an offence under  s.  811  of 
the  Code  by breaching the terms of 
a  s.  810.1  recognizance, they must resort to 
“the usual investigatory techniques and manner 
of proof as any other offence”. The residual 
power to impose conditions cannot be used to 
create by proxy a search warrant for the 
purpose of investigating suspected breaches of 
a recognizance order. 
In the result, to the extent that Conditions 8, 9 
and 10, read together, required [the accused] to 
submit to searches of his home and personal 
computer, they were not authorized by 
s. 810.1. [references omitted, paras. 128-130]
 
The Appeal Court, however, agreed with the Crown 
that the some of the conditions enumerated in 
the  current version  of  s.  810.1(3.02) are more 
intrusive than those that existed at the time the 
conditions were imposed in this case. But the 
Crown could not rely on the current version as 
evidence of Parliamentary intent “to condone 
aspects of enforcement in s. 810.1 orders”.
Volume 18 Issue 6 ~ November/December 2018
PAGE 34
s. 8 Charter Breach + s. 24(2)
Since the interim recognizance was invalid, the 
police had no lawful authority to search the 
accused’s home and computer without a warrant to 
ensure  compliance with the recognizance. As a 
consequence, there was no basis upon which the 
warrant to search the accused’s home could have 
been issued once the information from the 
warrantless search was excised from the ITO.  The 
accused’s s. 8 Charter right to be free from 
unreasonable search and seizure was thus 
infringed.
The Court of Appeal then considered s. 24(2) and 
concluded the trial judge made no error in 
excluding the evidence gathered from the accused’s 
home and computer devices.  Although the 
evidence was reliable and society had a compelling 
interest in cases involving crimes implicating the 
safety of children, the Charter infringing state 
conduct and the  impact of the breach on the 
Charter-protected interests of the accused were 
serious. 
First, even though the police acted in good faith by 
relying on the recognizance in searching the 
accused’s home, the police were waiting at his 
home to search it before the accused was given any 
opportunity to bring himself in compliance with the 
recognizance. Second, the searches were 
warrantless and the evidence was not otherwise 
discoverable. The intrusion into the accused’s home 
and personal computer, in which he had a very 
high expectation of privacy, was a serious invasion 
into his privacy interests. 
The trial judge’s exclusion of evidence was upheld 
and the Crown’s appeal seeking a new trial was 
dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Note-able Quote
“Don’t measure yourself by what you have 
accomplished but by what you should have 
accomplished with your ability.” 
John Wooden
JUDGE FAILED TO PROVIDE 
SUFFICIENT REASONS FOR 
FINDING OFFICER HAD RGB
R. v. Chowdhury, 2018 ABCA 348
 
If a judge does not provide sufficient 
reasons and fails to explain what 
grounds they relied upon and how 
those grounds objectively supported 
their conclusion that the accused 
had committed or was about to commit an 
indictable offence, a new trial may be  ordered. In 
this case, the  accused was facing several firearms 
offences. He argued at trial that the police had no 
reasonable grounds to arrest him and, therefore, 
any subsequent search was unlawful and breached 
s. 8 of the Charter. In finding a loaded 9 mm pistol 
hidden in a compartment of a vehicle admissible as 
evidence, the judge gave very brief reasons for 
upholding the legality of the arrest. 
“When one looks at all of the circumstances, 
and  the operating minds of the police  officers, 
based on the information that was coming in, no 
doubt in my mind that the police had reasonable 
and probable grounds to arrest all the occupants 
in the vehicle, in the circumstances,” said the 
judge on the voir dire. “And they did so. And I 
might add parenthetically, because this Court’s 
often been critical of police work, I find the police 
work done here  in these circumstances in effect of 
the arrest, had been careful, well thought out, and 
– and well executed. On that basis, I take it the 
evidence led on the voir dire, is obviously 
admissible  in the trial proper.” The judge went on 
to convict the accused of various firearm offences 
and sentenced him to 40 months’ imprisonment.
The Alberta Court of Appeal then overturned the 
accused’s conviction. In its view, these reasons 
provided by the trial judge in upholding the arrest 
were insufficient. The accused’s appeal was 
allowed, his conviction was vacated and a new trial 
was ordered before a different trial judge.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Editor’s note: Additional facts taken from R. v. 
Chowdhury, 2018 ABPC 22
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ADOPTION OF PARAGRAPHS 
WRITTEN IN THIRD PERSON 
OK: ITO VALID
R. v. Beaumont, 2018 BCCA 342
Police received information from a 
confidential informer of unknown 
reliability. The information identified 
the accused by name, and provided 
the address of his residence. The 
informer stated that the accused had a licence to 
grow marihuana at his home, but was growing 
more plants than were permitted by the licence. 
The informer also said there were two grow rooms 
in the house – one in the basement and one in the 
garage –  and that each room had 18 grow lights 
with 30 plants per light. This information was 
passed on to the affiant. There were two licences to 
produce medical marihuana associated with the 
residence allowing for up to 108 plants to be grown 
there.
Another officer, a  trained thermographer, made 
observations of the property  and took Forward 
Looking Infrared (FLIR) device  readings. He 
described the residence and reported that a portion 
of the basement and the garage had elevated heat 
signatures. As well, the half of the hydro box closest 
to the residence was hotter than the other half. The 
thermographer provided the resulting information 
to the affiant in the form of draft paragraphs for the 
ITO. These paragraphs were written from the 
standpoint of the recipient of the report, not from 
the thermographer’s own standpoint. For example, 
the draft stated, in part: “I was advised by [the 
t h e r m o g r a p h e r ] , t h a t h e i s a  t r a i n e d 
thermographer and utilized a thermal imaging 
device, also known as Forward Looking Infa Red 
(“FLIR”) while  conducting an examination of [the 
accused’s residence].” 
The affiant then contacted Fortis BC, the electricity 
supplier to the residence, and obtained electrical 
consumption data for a period of just over a year. 
Fortis BC had flagged the residence for unusually 
high electrical consumption. Recognizing that the 
legal marihuana grow operation at the residence 
would consume electricity, the affiant set out to 
estimate the amount it would be expected to use. 
Based on his calculations, which included 
estimating the amount of electricity an air 
conditioner might use based on furnace fan 
consumption, the affiant concluded that the 
accused was consuming almost three times more 
power than he should be consuming. He also noted 
that water consumption data for the property was 
also excessive, which was “consistent with a larger 
grow operation”.
The affiant obtained a  search warrant 
for the accused’s residence on the 
basis that there were reasonable 
grounds to believe that a larger grow 
operation was being conducted on the 
site, and that a search of the residence 
would furnish evidence of illegal 
marihuana production. The ITO for the 
warrant contained the information 
provided by the confidential source, 
readings from the FLIR, and electricity 
consumption data. When the search 
was conducted, police  found a total of 
3,317 marihuana plants in the home. 
British Columbia Supreme Court
The accused argued that the search 
warrant ought to have been ruled 
invalid. He first challenged the “facial 
validity” of the search warrant. He 
submitted:
• the evidence of the confidential informer was 
of unknown reliability, and that the source of 
the informer’s information was unknown. 
• the electrical consumption evidence was of 
limited assistance because it was not based on 
a comparison of the accused’s residence with 
other homes of similar size and construction 
that housed a 108 plant legal grow operation; 
and 
• the FLIR data  was as consistent with a legal 
grow operation as with an illegal one.
In upholding the warrant, the judge noted the 
question was not whether she would have issued 
the warrant, but whether there was admissible 
evidence before the issuing justice that was 
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reasonably capable of belief and that would 
provide grounds for the issuance of the search 
warrant. She considered three factors in assessing 
the information provided by  the informer - whether 
the information was compelling, whether the 
source was credible, and whether investigation 
corroborated elements of the information. 
Although the informer was of unknown reliability 
and their source of information was unknown, she 
found the information to be compelling (detailed) 
and meaningfully corroborated (FLIR and electrical 
consumption).
The accused then sought to challenge the 
“subfacial validity” of the  search warrant. 
Although the judge granted leave to cross-examine 
the FLIR operator and the affiant on the electricity 
consumption information, she did not allow the 
accused to cross-examine the affiant in relation to 
the source of information or character of the 
informer as this would likely be privileged. 
The thermographer indicated that he adopted a 
practice of writing his reports in the third person to 
make it easier for his colleagues to prepare  ITOs 
simply  by cutting and pasting paragraphs of his 
reports. The accused characterized this practice as 
being one where the thermographer was 
“pretending to be  [the affiant]”. He contended this 
would subvert the entire  prior authorization 
process. The judge, however, rejected this 
characterization. “There is nothing inherently 
wrong with the  FLIR operator writing his report in 
the third person,” said the judge. “The caveat is 
that, of course, the affiant must carefully  read it 
and ensure  that, to the best of his knowledge, it is 
accurate before he inserts it  into his ITO … .” The 
judge found that affiant read the paragraphs drafted 
by the thermographer and satisfied himself that the 
paragraphs accurately reflected his beliefs, based 
on the information provided by the  thermographer. 
Although the judge found the  Crown should have 
disclosed the third person report to the accused, 
this non-disclosure was not sufficiently serious to 
justify  excising the FLIR information from the ITO 
as it was not calculated to mislead.
As for the  evidence concerning consumption of 
electricity, the judge excised the estimate of the 
amount of electricity needed for air conditioning 
because  the affiant lacked knowledge in the area of 
comparing air conditioners to fans. The judge, 
however, rejected the accused’s effort to excise the 
power consumption information because the affiant 
relied on his experience with illegal grow 
operations in preparing his estimates rather than 
What the trial judge found 
COMPELLING (detailed):
The informer provided:
• The street name on which the accused's house was 
located; 
• The first and last name of the accused; 
• The fact that there was a licenced grow operation 
at that address or at that residence; 
• The fact that there were many more plants than 
permitted by the licences; 
• The fact that that the grow operation was in two 
rooms, one in the basement and one in the garage; 
and 
• The fact that there were 18 lights per room with 
30 plants per light.
What the trial judge found 
CORROBORATING:
• FLIR found heat signatures emanating from the 
basement and the garage. 
• The police were able to corroborate the accused's 
association with the residence, 
• The police were able to corroborate the location of 
the residence, 
• The police were able to corroborate the fact that 
there was a licenced grow operation at the 
residence. 
• The hydroelectric consumption information was 
more consistent with what the informer told the 
police about the grow operation than with a 108 
plant licenced grow operation.
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researching and providing information on legal 
grow operations. “There is no evidence before me 
that there is, in fact, any different practice 
employed by licenced marihuana growers and no 
basis upon which I could find that the affiant knew 
or ought to have known of such difference if one 
even exists,” said the judge. The validity of the 
search warrant was upheld and the accused was 
convicted of producing marihuana.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused again argued that 
i t was improper for the 
thermographer to provide his 
report to the  affiant in the  form 
of paragraphs to be cut and pasted into the ITO, 
and that this served to subvert the prior 
authorization process. Further, he maintained that 
the electricity consumption data should have been 
excised from the ITO or, alternatively, given no 
weight. Finally, had the electricity consumption 
information been excised, he contended that the 
ITO did not supply the necessary reasonable 
grounds, the standard required for the issuance of a 
warrant. Since the warrant should have been set 
aside, he wanted an acquittal entered or at least a 
new trial ordered. 
Cut and Paste Paragraphs
Justice Groberman, authorizing 
the Court of Appeal’s decision, 
disagreed that the manner in 
which the thermographer 
prepared his report in the third 
person subverted the judicial 
authorization process and 
should have resulted in the 
warrant being quashed. Even if there was a residual 
discretion for a  judge to set aside a warrant which 
was otherwise  predicated on a proper evidentiary 
foundation, this case was not one in which the 
residual discretion would apply. There was no 
fraud, intentional misleading or other abuse that 
could be said to undermine the prior authorization 
process. Instead, the  Appeal Court found “there 
was nothing at all improper in the manner in 
which [the thermographer] prepared his report”:
[C]ounsel for [the accused] mischaracterizes 
[the thermographer’s] conduct when he says 
that [the thermographer] “pretended” to be [the 
affiant]. He did nothing fraudulent or 
misleading. It cannot be said that he intended 
to mislead [the affiant] by writing his report in 
the third person; [the affiant] obviously knew 
tha t the repor t was wr i t t en by [ the 
thermographer], not by himself. [para. 46]
And further:
What occurred here was no more than that [the 
thermographer] drafted paragraphs for 
inclusion in [the affiant’s] ITO. It was up to [the 
affiant] to consider the paragraphs, and to 
decide whether or not to include them. There is 
no suggestion that the paragraphs were 
inaccurate, nor that [the affiant] was under any 
pressure to use the paragraphs.
There is nothing untoward about a person 
drafting a statement that is to be sworn by 
another person, as long as sufficient care is 
taken to ensure that the [affiant] is in a position 
to swear to the facts in the statement, and does 
so voluntarily. In fact, many, if not most, 
affidavits used in the courts are drafted by 
persons other than the [affiant]. [paras. 48-49]
The affiant’s “inclusion of the paragraphs in the 
ITO was not calculated to mislead the issuing 
justice and had no capacity to do so,”  said Justice 
Groberman. “No one reading the ITO could be 
misled by its contents.” Thus, there was no basis to 
consider setting aside the warrant.
“There is nothing untoward about a 
person drafting a statement that is to be 
sworn by another person, as long as 
sufficient care is taken to ensure that the 
[affiant] is in a position to swear to the 
facts in the statement, and does so 
voluntarily. In fact, many, if not most, 
affidavits used in the courts are drafted 
by persons other than the [affiant].”
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Electricity Consumption Evidence
The Appeal Court 
rejected the accused’s 
submission that the 
affiant had a duty to 
highlight his lack of 
experience in legal 
medical marihuana 
grow operations in the ITO, or investigate and 
provide information on electricity usage in legal 
grow operations. First, the  ITO described the 
affiant’s involvement in investigating grow 
operations which would be understood to be illegal 
ones. Second, it was mere speculation that a legal 
grow operation might consume more electricity 
than an illegal one. There was no suggestion that 
the affiant had any reason to suspect that there 
would be any significant difference in electrical 
consumption between a  legal and an illegal 
operation, and there  was no basis provided “to 
doubt that electricity consumption in legal grow 
operations is similar to (if, perhaps, not exactly the 
same as) consumption in illegal operations.” 
Finally, the sources of information used to calculate 
the average anticipated electrical consumption data 
were disclosed. There was sufficient information to 
allow the issuing justice to assess the credibility of 
the information and the validity  of the  officer’s 
assumptions (apart from the air conditioning data in 
the excised portion of the ITO). The consumption 
information, despite certain frailties, was capable of 
showing that the electricity usage significantly 
exceeded what would be expected for the 
residence, even taking into account a legal 108 
plant marihuana grow operation:
[T]he ITO in the case before us took into 
account the medical marihuana licences, and 
attempted to account for the electrical needs of 
such an operation. … .
The evidence in the ITO showed that the 
[accused’s] residence was using vastly more 
electricity than an average home, and even 
when a generous estimate was added to 
account for the legal grow operation, only a 
fraction of the consumption could be 
explained. The information was sufficient to 
show that seasonal heating or cooling 
requirements were not responsible for the 
excessive consumption, as a full year of data 
was set out. The ITO also noted that there were 
no visible pools or hot tubs active at the 
residence. [paras. 60-61]
Sufficiency of the Grounds
The Appeal Court concluded that the trial judge did 
not err in holding that the confidential source 
information was compelling, and significantly 
corroborated by the FLIR and electrical 
consumption evidence:
The evidence of the confidential informant 
included significant details with respect to the 
grow operation, and those details were 
corroborated by the FLIR data. The excessive 
electrical consumption of the residence could 
be accounted for by the presence of a large-
scale grow operation of the sort described by 
the informant, and there was no other ready 
explanation for it. In the circumstances, the 
evidence before the issuing justice met 
the Garofoli standard. It provided evidence that 
gave rise to a reasonable belief that a search of 
the premises would disclose that an illegal 
marihuana production facility was being 
operated there. [para. 64]
The search warrant was upheld and the accused’s 
appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
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ENTRAPMENT TEST NEED ONLY 
REASONABLE SUSPICION, NOT 
PROOF BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT
R. v. Ndahirwa, 2018 ABCA 359
 
After police obtained the accused’s 
telephone number from a confidential 
informer, an undercover police officer 
contacted the accused to arrange a 
purchase of cocaine. As a result, the 
accused pled guilty  to trafficking in cocaine. An 
application for a stay of proceedings based on 
entrapment was denied by the Alberta Court of 
Queen’s Bench. The judge noted that the test for 
entrapment was whether the authorities provided 
the person with the opportunity to commit an 
offence without acting on a reasonable suspicion 
that the person was already engaged in criminal 
activity or when the police were acting pursuant to 
a bona fide inquiry. 
In assessing whether the undercover officer had a 
reasonable suspicion based on objectively 
discernible facts that would justify the telephone 
call to the accused, the  judge examined the 
evidence to see  if it was compelling, credible, and 
corroborated. The judge concluded that the 
information received by the police was sufficiently 
detailed to make it compelling. As well, the 
person who answered the phone responded as the 
informer suggested he would, prior to the topic of 
drugs even being raised. And, although some of the 
details provided by  the informer did not match the 
accused and his vehicle, the judge was satisfied 
that the events conformed sufficiently to the 
anticipated pattern to remove the possibility of 
innocent coincidence. Moreover, the police  had 
used this informer on a number of occasions and 
he had previously provided credible information. 
The accused then appealed the denial of his 
entrapment claim to the Alberta  Court of Appeal. 
He submitted that that police could have done 
more to corroborate  the tip by following up on the 
information since not all information matched the 
accused. Further, in his view, not enough detail was 
provided about the informer. As well, the informer 
was paid, had a criminal record and may have had 
a drug addiction.  
Justice O’Ferrall, delivering the Court of Appeal’s 
opinion, found protecting informer privilege 
precluded the disclosure as the accused suggested. 
And, even though the informer was paid, had a 
record, and may have had a  drug addiction, those 
things did not displace the informer’s record of 
providing accurate  information. As for whether all 
the information need be corroborated or match 
the accused, Justice O’Ferral stated:
The test is that there must be a “reasonable 
suspicion”, not proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, or even proof on a balance of 
probabilities. The information available to the 
undercover officer may not have been sufficient 
to support a conviction, but it was sufficient to 
raise a reasonable suspicion based on verifiable 
facts, going beyond random virtue testing.
The low-key, test buyer approach used by the 
undercover officers in this case does not 
engage the risk of enticing innocent persons to 
commit crimes that they would not otherwise 
commit. [references omitted, paras. 5-6]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“The test is that there must be a 
‘reasonable suspicion’, not proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, or even proof on a 
balance of probabilities. The information 
available to the undercover officer may not 
have been sufficient to support a 
conviction, but it was sufficient to raise a 
reasonable suspicion based on verifiable 
facts, going beyond random virtue testing.”
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POLICE MEMORIAL 
SHOULDER FLASH 
UNVEILED BY NEW 
WESTMINSTER PD
New Westminster – The New 
Westminster Police Department 
(NWPD) has unveiled a custom 
designed police memorial shoulder 
flash that officers will wear as part 
of their duty uniforms as a sign of 
respect for fallen police officers. 
The police memorial shoulder flash 
will be worn in the event of a 
fallen Canadian police officer until 
the time of their memorial service.
 
“These shoulder flashes are a very 
visible way for us to show our 
support for our brothers and 
sisters in our law enforcement 
family,” stated Chief Constable 
Dave Jones. “As a society, as police 
officers, as people who enjoy the 
rights and freedoms given to all 
citizens, may we never forget the 
sacrifices made by those who have 
given everything defending and 
protecting us.”
 
The company, Emblazon, who 
makes the shoulder flashes for the 
NWPD will be donating proceeds 
from the sale of the police 
memorial shoulder flashes to the 
Po l ice and Peace Of f ice r s ’ 
Memorial Ribbon Fund.
 
The staff-led initiative adds to the 
current specialty NWPD shoulder 
flashes for Pride, anti-bullying, 
domestic violence, Remembrance 
Day, and Canada Day.
Source: New Westminster Police Department
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ILLICT DRUG OVERDOSE 
DEATHS IN 2018
The Office of BC’s Chief Coroner has released 
statistics for illicit drug overdose deaths in the 
province from January 1, 2008 to November 30, 
2018. In November there were 120 suspected drug 
overdose deaths. This represents a +13% increase 
over the number of deaths occurring in November 
2017 and a  +9%  increase over October 2018. The 
November 2018 statistics amount to about 4 
people dying every day of the month.
There were a  total of 1,380  illicit drug overdose 
deaths from January  through November 2018. This 
is one death less than last year’s total at this time.  
The 1,486  overdose deaths last year (2017) 
amounted to more than a 346%  over 2013. The 
report also attributed fentanyl laced drugs as 
accounting for the increase in deaths. 
People aged 30-39 were  the hardest hit so far in 
2018 with 361  illicit drug  overdose deaths 
followed by 50-59 year-olds at 322  deaths. People 
aged 40-49 years-old accounted for 301 deaths 
while those aged 19-29 had 265 deaths. Vancouver 
had the most deaths at 361 followed by Surrey 
(195), Victoria  (85), Kelowna (53), Kamloops (39), 
Prince George (38) and Abbotsford (37). 
Males continue to die  at almost a 4:1 ratio 
compared to females. From January to September 
2018, 1,109 males have died while there were 271 
female deaths.
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The 2018 data indicates that most illicit drug 
overdose deaths (86.3%) occurred inside while 
12.0% occurred outside. For 23 deaths, the 
location was unknown. 
“Private residence” includes 
residences, driveways, garages, 
trailer homes.
“Other residence” includes hotels, motels, rooming 
houses, shelters, etc.
“Other inside” includes facilities, occupational sites, 
public buildings and businesses.
“Outside” includes vehicles, streets, sidewalks,  parks, 
wooded areas, campgrounds and parking lots.
DEATHS SINCE PUBLIC HEALTH 
EMERGENCY
In April 2016, BC’s provincial health officer 
declared a public health emergency in response to 
the rise in drug overdoses and deaths. The number 
of overdose deaths in the 32 months preceding the 
declaration (Aug 2013-Mar 2016) totaled 1,251. 
The number of deaths in the 32 months following 
the declaration (Apr 2016-Nov 2018) totaled 
3,639. This is an increase of 191%.
23166
55
339 797
Private Residence
Other Residence
Other Inside
Outside
Unknown
Deaths by location: Jan-Feb 2018
Source: Illicit Drug Overdose Deaths in BC - January 1, 2008 to 
November 30, 2018.  Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor 
General, Coroners Service. December 27, 2018.
TYPES OF DRUGS
The top five detected drugs relevant to illicit drug overdose deaths from 2016 - 2018 were fentanyl, which 
was detected in 78.4%  of deaths, cocaine (48.6%), methamphetamine/amphetamine (31.2%), ethyl 
alcohol (25.5%), and heroin (21.0%). 
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 Illicit Drug Overdose Deaths in BC, Jan-Nov 2018
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FENTANYL DETECTED 
DEATHS IN BC
The BC Coroners Service  released a  report 
summarizing all deaths that occurred between 
January 1, 2012 and September 30, 2018 for which 
fentanyl and its analogues were detected. In the 
majority of cases, fentanyl or its analogues were 
detected in combination with other drugs.
 
In 2018, fentanyl or its analogues were detected in 
85% of illicit drug overdose deaths. 
Like the overall illicit drug overall deaths, males 
continue to die at almost a  4:1  ratio compared to 
females in which fentanyl or its analogues were 
detected. From January to August 2018, 780  males 
died while there were  196 female deaths in which 
fentanyl was detected.
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SPOUSAL PRIVILEGE DID NOT 
EXTEND TO TEXT MESSAGES
R. v. Cuthill, 2018 ABCA 321
 
With the assistance of a  production 
order under s. 487.014 of the 
Criminal Code, the police were able 
to recover text messages exchanged 
between three accused charged with 
murder, including Sheena Cuthill and her husband 
Timothy. Unlike other major cell phone service 
providers, Telus retained not only information about 
who called or texted whom, and when, but also the 
actual messages. These text messages were highly 
incriminating and suggested a plan to kidnap and 
kill the victim. 
At trial in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, the 
judge found that spousal communication privilege 
under s. 4(3) of the Canada Evidence Act (CEA) 
applied only to the  testimony of the spouse but did 
not otherwise protect spousal communications 
themselves. The text messages were admitted and a 
jury went on to convict all three accused of first 
degree murder. 
Sheena Cuthill appealed her murder conviction to 
the Alberta Court of Appeal, in part, by asserting 
that the evidence of the  contents of the text 
messages exchanged between her and her husband 
were not admissible  on the basis of spousal 
communication privilege  and should have been 
excluded as evidence.
Text Messages & Spousal Communication 
Privilege 
Section  4(3) of the CEA reads as follows: 
s. 4(3) No husband is compellable  to 
disclose any communication made to him by 
his wife during  their marriage, and no wife 
i s c o m p e l l a b l e t o d i s c l o s e a n y 
communication made to her by her husband 
during their marriage.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that 
spousal communication privilege did not apply to 
spousal communications discovered independently, 
for example by being overheard or contained in a 
letter found by another. Thus, s. 4(3) did not extend 
spousal communication privilege to the text 
messages in issue. The Appeal Court also refused 
Cuthill’s invitation to broaden the law and extend 
spousal communication privilege to the text 
messages  requiring  that they  be excluded from 
evidence. First, the Appeal Court was unwilling to 
ignore the clear meaning of the words used and 
recent jurisprudence interpreting them. Second, 
reading into the legislation broader protections for 
spousal communication privilege would exceed the 
Appeal Court’s authority. Rather than filling a minor 
gap, the Court of Appeal was being asked to re-
write the  legislation, something they had no 
authority to do.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
CROWN MUST PROVE BEYOND 
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT 
YOUTH NOT DETAINED
R. v. N.B., 2018 ONCA 556
The accused, a  16-year-old youth at 
the time of the  offence, was convicted 
by a jury of first degree murder and 
sentenced as an adult to l i fe 
imprisonment without eligibility for 
parole for 10 years. Statements he made to police 
were admitted into evidence after the trial judge 
found the accused had failed to meet his burden of 
showing that he  was psychologically detained on a 
balance of probabilities to engage s. 146(2) of 
the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA). 
In his lengthy  decision, Justice Pepall, authoring the 
Court of Appeal’s unanimous judgement, analyzed 
the YCJA and addressed the standard of proof 
applicable to the requirements of s. 146(2). In this 
case, the Appeal Court ruled that the trial judge 
erred in reversing the burden of proof in relation to 
the admissibility of the accused’s statements. Rather 
than the accused proving on a balance of 
probabilities that he was detained for the provisions 
of s. 146(2) to apply, the onus was on the Crown to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
accused was not detained. The accused’s appeal 
was allowed, his murder conviction was set aside 
and a new trial was ordered. 
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s. 146(2) Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA)
As a  result of this decision, the following points 
were extracted to highlight the contours of the law 
relating to the  admissibility of statements as it 
applies to young persons:  
• The YCJA lays down special rules applying to all 
young person (12 years of age or older but less 
than 18 years of age).
• s. 146(2) is exclusionary by nature, but 
inclusionary by exception.
• The special protections afforded to young 
persons under s. 146(2) are broader and more 
robust than those afforded under s. 10(b) of 
the Charter. 
• There are three preconditions to the application 
of the section: arrest, detention, or reasonable 
grounds for believing (RGB) the young person 
has committed an offence.  If none of these 
preconditions is triggered, the police are entitled 
to interview youth witnesses and rely on their 
statements as admissible even when the 
informational and implementation components 
under s. 146(2) have not been carried out.
• If any of the three above preconditions (arrest, 
detention, RGB) apply, s. 146(2) then describes 
both informational and implementational 
components for admissibility of a statement.
➡ Informational component (s. 146(2)(b)) – 
the police must provide the young person 
with a clear explanation of their rights. The 
test for compliance with the informational 
component is objective. 
➡ Implementational component (ss. 146(2)(c) 
and (d)) – the police must give the young 
person a “reasonable opportunity” to 
consult with counsel, and a parent or other 
adult. If the young person elects to consult 
with counsel, and/or a parent or adult, the 
police must provide  the young person a 
“reasonable opportunity” to make their 
statement in the presence of counsel, and/or 
the chosen adult.
BY THE BOOK:
Youth Criminal Justice Act
s. 146 (2) No oral or written statement made by 
a young person  who is less than eighteen years 
old, to a peace officer or to any other person 
who is, in law, a person in authority,  on the 
arrest or detention of the young person  or in 
circumstances where the peace officer or other person 
has reasonable grounds for believing that the young person has 
committed an offence is admissible against the young person 
unless
(a) The statement was voluntary;
(b) The person to whom the statement was made has, before 
the statement was made,  clearly explained  to the young 
person, in language appropriate to his or her age and 
understanding, that
(i) the young person is under no obligation to make a 
statement,
(ii) any statement made by the young person  may be 
used as evidence in proceedings against him or her,
(iii) the young person has the  right to consult counsel 
and a parent  or other person in accordance with 
paragraph (c), and
(iv) any statement made by the young person is required 
to be made in the presence of counsel and any other 
person consulted in accordance with paragraph (c), 
if any, unless the young person desires otherwise;
(c) The young person has, before the statement was made, 
been given a reasonable opportunity to consult
(i) with counsel, and
(ii) with a  parent  or, in the absence of a parent, an 
adult relative or, in the absence of a parent and an 
adult relative, any other appropriate adult chosen 
by the young person, as long as that person is not a 
co-accused, or under investigation, in respect of the 
same offence; and
(d) If the young person consults a person in accordance with 
paragraph (c), the young person has been given 
a  reasonable opportunity to make the statement in the 
presence of that person. 
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• The Crown always bears the burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt  the cumulative 
requirements of s . 146(2) for a young person’s 
statement to be admissible. This includes the 
Crown proving, beyond a  reasonable doubt, 
that:
➡ The statement was voluntary [s. 146(2)(a)].
➡ The adequacy of the statutorily mandated 
informational component [s. 146(2)(b)] and 
implementational component [s. 146(2)(c) 
and (d)], and the adequacy of any waiver 
[s. 146(4)].
➡ Whether the young person was not “arrested 
or detained” or that the  peace officer did not 
“have reasonable grounds for believing that 
the young person has committed an 
offence”. 
• The “arrest or detention” need not relate to the 
ultimate  charge the young person faces at trial 
in order to trigger the protections of s. 146(2). 
For example, if a young person is detained and 
not read his rights related to one  offence, but 
then gives incriminating statements related to 
another offence, the police have not complied 
with s. 146(2) and the statements will not be 
admissible. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Comparing & Contrasting s. 10(b) Charter & s. 146(2) YCJA
s. 10(b) s. 146(2)
Trigger • arrest or detention • arrest, detention, or reasonable grounds for 
believing young person committed an offence
Informational Duty • inform a person of their right to 
counsel
• inform a young person of their right to consult 
with a lawyer, and a parent or other adult 
prior to making a statement
Implementational Duty • invoked by detainee
• reasonable opportunity must be 
provided
• there is no right to have counsel 
present during a police interview
• young person must waive implementational 
duty
• young person entitled to have a lawyer and a 
parent or other adult present when the police 
take any statements from the young person
Waiver • waiver need not be in writing nor 
audio or videotaped.
• any waiver of s. 146(2) rights must be audio 
and videotaped or written and signed by the 
youth
Admissibility • presumptively admissible
• accused bears burden of proof to 
show statement inadmissible on a 
balance of probabilities
• s. 24(2) considers whether 
admission would bring the 
administration of justice into 
disrepute
• presumptively inadmissible
• Crown bears burden of proof to show 
statement admissible beyond a reasonable 
doubt
• s. 146(6) considers whether admission would 
bring into disrepute the principle that young 
persons are entitled enhanced procedural 
protections to ensure fair treatment and 
protection of rights
• admissibility for non-compliance with s. 
146(2) limited to “technical irregularity”
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FIELD STRIP SEARCH 
UNREASONABLE, BUT 
EVIDENCE ADMITTED
R. v. Pilon, 2018 ONCA 959 
The police obtained a warrant under 
the  Controlled Drugs and Substances 
Act to search a motel room. When 
police entered the room they arrested 
all three of its occupants, including 
the accused. He resisted arrest, but was eventually 
handcuffed behind his back where he was seen 
repeatedly trying to place his hands in the front and 
back of his shorts.  As police searched him they 
noticed he was wearing  two pairs of shorts. They 
removed the outer pair of shorts and discovered a 
roll of cash tucked in the  pocket of the inner pair of 
shorts. Police looked inside the second pair of 
shorts and discovered the accused was not wearing 
underwear. An officer saw the top of the accused’s 
buttocks and an elastic band attached to his penis. 
The accused remained non-compliant and 
continued reaching inside his shorts. Believing he 
was attempting  to hide items and concerned for 
safety, police took the accused to the motel 
bathroom and strip searched him. The accused’s 
waistband was pulled away from his body so his 
genital area could be viewed. An officer, wearing 
surgical gloves, reached in and pulled out a pill 
bottle containing fentanyl patches and a ball of 
electrical tape with crack cocaine inside. These had 
been attached by an elastic band to the accused’s 
penis. 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused did not dispute the search 
warrant, conceded his arrest was lawful 
and agreed the police  were searching 
for evidence related to his arrest. He 
did, however, argue that the strip search was 
unreasonable because the police lacked exigent 
circumstances to justify it be conducted in the  field 
(not at a police station). 
The judge found there were two strip searches. The 
first one, which did not breach s. 8 of the Charter, 
occurred when the  officer pulled the accused’s 
inner shorts away from his body and observed the 
elastic around the accused’s penis. The judge found 
this was an accidental strip search – the officer did 
not anticipate  the accused would not be wearing 
underwear. The search was not very intrusive, was 
discontinued once the elastic  band tied to the 
accused’s penis was observed, no one else saw the 
accused’s genital area and there was no bodily 
contact. 
As for the second strip search, it too was 
reasonable. Although there was no basis for police 
to believe that the item being concealed was a 
weapon, the judge concluded there were exigent 
circumstances that rendered the motel room strip 
search reasonable. There was a risk  that evidence 
could be lost. The accused tried to dispose of drugs 
or otherwise prevent their detection. And there was 
a risk  that the accused would harm himself if he 
was placed in a cruiser and taken to the police 
station. Moreover, the second strip search was 
conducted in a reasonable manner. It was 
minimally invasive, very brief, conducted in a 
separate room and at no time was the accused 
naked. Only one officer saw the accused’s groin 
area. This officer wore  gloves and, if there was any 
contact with the accused’s genitals, it would have 
been fleeting  and incidental to the  removal of the 
drugs. Furthermore, the search was only conducted 
after the accused repeatedly refused to yield the 
drugs. The accused was convicted of possessing 
crack cocaine and fentanyl for the purpose of 
trafficking and he was sentenced to 30 months’ 
imprisonment.
Ontario Court of Appeal 
The accused argued that the 
two strip searches violated his 
s. 8 Charter rights and the trial 
j u d g e e r r e d i n f i n d i n g 
otherwise. Justice Hourigan, speaking for the 
Ontario Court of Appeal, agreed and concluded 
that the strip searches were unreasonable. In his 
view, the strip searches should have been 
conducted at the police station rather than in the 
field (in the motel room). 
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Strip Searches 
A strip search has been defined by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in R. v. Golden, 2001 SCC 83 as 
“the removal or rearrangement of some or all of 
the clothing of a person so as to permit a visual 
inspection of a person’s private areas, namely 
genitals, buttocks, breasts (in the case of a female), 
or undergarments”. Strip searches can be 
conducted as an incident to arrest provided:
1. they are conducted for the purpose of 
discovering weapons in the arrestee’s 
possession or evidence related to the arrest, 
2. the police establish reasonable grounds 
justifying the strip search in addition to 
reasonable grounds justifying the arrest and 
3. the strip search is carried out in a reasonable 
manner.  
Moreover, a strip search should be conducted at a 
po l ice s ta t ion unless there  a re ex igent 
circumstances requiring it be conducted in the field 
(prior to being transported to a police station). As 
well, strip searches should not be carried out as a 
matter of routine nor does an arrestee’s non-
cooperation and resistance necessarily entitle the 
police to engage in behaviour that disregards or 
compromises the a r res tee ’s phys ica l o r 
psychological integrity and safety. A series of 
guidelines are also to be considered in determining 
whether a strip search is conducted in a reasonable 
manner. 
In this case, the Ontario Court of Appeal found 
both strip searches to be constitutionally non-
compliant. As for the  first strip search, it was not 
accidental. Although the officer did not anticipate 
that the accused would not be wearing  underwear, 
a strip search is defined as including the 
rearrangement of some or all of the clothing of a 
person so as to permit a visual inspection of a 
person’s undergarments. Hence, when the 
accused’s waistband was pulled back in an effort to 
view his underwear, he was strip searched. The 
police, however, failed to establish that there were 
exigent circumstances that justified this field strip 
search on safety grounds or the need to preserve 
evidence. “[The officer] testified that he observed 
the [accused] attempting to reach into the 
waistband of his shorts,” said Justice Hourigan. 
“Although he did not know what the [accused] was 
reaching for, it does not appear that his concerns 
were safety related. Instead, he had a hunch, 
based on prior investigations, that the [accused] 
was carrying drugs in his groin area. However, [the 
officer] did not attempt to justify the first strip 
search on the  basis that there was a real possibility 
that evidence would be destroyed.”  
As for the second strip search, it too failed the 
reasonableness test. There were no exigent 
circumstances, either to a risk of the loss of 
evidence or a need to protect safety, that warranted 
a strip search in the field:     
• Preservation of Evidence: Justice Hourigan 
concluded there  were no exigent circumstances 
related to destruction of evidence. The accused 
“was in a confined space, handcuffed, and 
surrounded by police officers. If he somehow 
was able  to dispose of the  drugs undetected, it 
is a common sense inference that they would 
be easily retrievable by the police. Further, 
there would be strong circumstantial evidence 
that the [accused] was in possession of the 
drugs.”
• Safety Concerns: Since there was nothing  to 
lead the officers to believe the object attached 
to the accused’s penis was a  weapon, there 
were no exigent circumstances that justified a 
search for a weapon in the field. Nor did, as the 
trial judge found, the accused’s ongoing efforts 
to gain access to what was hidden in his shorts 
and his level of physical resistance create a  risk 
that he would harm himself if he was placed in 
a cruiser and taken to the police station for a 
strip search. “The difficulty  in transporting the 
[accused] is not causally  connected to, let 
alone resolved by, the police conducting a strip 
search in the motel room,” said Justice 
Hourigan. “The [accused] had been defiant and 
physically uncooperative from the moment the 
police  entered the motel room. There was no 
basis for the police to speculate or the trial 
judge to conclude that the [accused] would 
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become compliant if the strip search was 
conducted at the  motel room. The police were 
still required to transport the [accused] to the 
police  station after the strip search was 
conducted.”
Admissibility Analysis
Although the Court of Appeal held that both strip 
searches breached s. 8 of the Charter because the 
police failed to establish exigent circumstances 
justifying field searches, the evidence was 
nevertheless admitted under s. 24(2). The police 
acted in good faith. There was no evidence the 
searches were routine practice and, had the strip 
searches been conducted at the police station, they 
would have been reasonable. “Other than 
location, they were textbook examples of how 
strip searches should be conducted,”  said the Court 
of Appeal. Furthermore, the  evidence was highly 
reliable and the charges were very serious. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed and his 
conviction was upheld. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
R. v. Golden, 2001 SCC 83
1. Can the strip search be conducted at the police station and, if not, why not?
 
2. Will the strip search be conducted in a  manner that ensures the health and safety of all 
involved?
     
3. Will the strip search be authorized by a police officer acting in a supervisory capacity?
4. Has it been ensured that the police officer(s) carrying out the strip search are of the 
same gender as the individual being searched?
5. Will the number of police officers involved in the search be no more than is 
reasonably necessary in the circumstances? 
6. What is the minimum of force necessary to conduct the strip search?
7. Will the strip search be carried out in a private area such that no one other than the 
individuals engaged in the search can observe the search? 
8. Will the strip search be conducted as quickly as possible and in a way that ensures that 
the person is not completely undressed at any one time?
9. Will the strip search involve only a visual inspection of the arrestee’s genital and anal 
areas without any physical contact?
10. If the visual inspection reveals the presence of a  weapon or evidence in a body cavity 
(not including the mouth), will the detainee be given the option of removing the object 
himself or of having the object removed by a trained medical professional?
11. Will a proper record be kept of the reasons for and the manner in which the strip 
search was conducted?
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January 25, 2019 
In Person or Webcast                             Click here.
February 8, 2019 
In Person or Webcast                             Click here.
March 4, 2019    Optional Workshop: March 5, 2019
In Person or Webcast                             Click here.
UPCOMING         
EXTERNAL LEARNING 
OPPORTUNITIES
April 26, 2019 
In Person or Webcast                             Click here.
March 22, 2019   
In Person or Webcast                             Click here.
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E-COMM RELEASES ITS 
2018 TOP 10 LIST 
OF 911 CALLS
E-Comm (Emergency Communications for British 
Columbia Incorporated), BC’s 911 call centre 
and integrated dispatch services for police 
agencies and fire departments, has released its 
2018 annual top 10 list of reasons not to call 
911.
1. To complain a local fast food restaurant 
wasn’t open 24-hours-a-day, as advertised.
2. To complain a store won’t take shoes back 
without the original box.
3. To complain that a gas station attendant 
put the wrong type of gas in their car.
4. To report a rental company provided the 
wrong-sized vehicle for a customer’s 
reservation.
5. To report a restaurant wouldn’t redeem a 
customer’s coupon.
6. To ask for help turning off their car lights.
7. To report their vehicle’s windshield wipers 
had stopped working.
8. To find out where their car had been 
towed.
9. To report a lost jacket.
10. To ask if the clocks move forward or 
backward during the spring time change.
Source: E-Comm 911
Okay, so sorry, you’re 
calling because you 
asked for 91 gas and 
they put regular gas in 
your car?
“
”
911 Operator
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SEX ASSAULTS RISE AFTER 
#MeToo
According to a recent Statistics Canada report, 
sexual assaults reports to police that involved an 
accused known to the victim increased after 
#MeToo went viral in October 2017. During the 
post #MeToo period from October 1 - December 
31, 2017 there were 6,766 victims of sexual assault 
incidents reported to police and deemed founded. 
This represented an average of 74 sexual assault 
victims reporting to police per day. Before #MeToo 
there  were only  an average of 59 sexual assault 
victims reporting to police per day. This represents 
an increase of 25%.
In total, 2017 represented the most sexual assault 
reports since 1998. 
VICTIMS OF POLICE-REPORTED SEXUAL 
ASSAULT BY QUARTERLY PERIOD
Province/
Territory
Pre-#MeToo
Avg. Rate
Post-#MeToo
Avg. Rate
% Change
QC 12.4 20.0 61%
NL 14.5 19.8 36%
MB 26.0 33.0 27%
ON 14.2 16.9 19%
BC 12.9 15.0 16%
NS 18.0 20.6 15%
NB 12.3 13.4 9%
NU 104.8 113.2 8%
AB 16.8 17.9 7%
PEI 12.2 12.6 3%
SK 25.3 25.5 1%
NWT 87.7 78.8 -10%
YK 50.6 41.7 -18%
Rate is based on 100,000 annual population.
Source: Police-reported sexual assaults in Canada before and after #MeToo, 2016 and 2017. Juristat. Statistics Canada. Catalogue no. 85-002-X. 
https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/85-002-x/2018001/article/54980-eng.htm [accessed December 21, 2018]
VICTIMS OF POLICE-REPORTED SEXUAL 
ASSAULT BY QUARTERLY PERIOD
CMA Pre-
#MeToo
Avg. Rate
Post-
#MeToo
Avg. Rate
% 
Change
Quebec City, QC 11.7 20.8 78%
Sherbrooke, QC 15.1 26.5 76%
Brantford, ON 17.0 29.9 76%
Saguenay, QC 12.9 21.8 69%
Montreal, QC 12.0 20.0 67%
London, ON 13.0 21.2 63%
Kingston, ON 18.5 29.7 61%
Peterborough, ON 23.0 36.3 58%
Kitchener-Cambridge-
Waterloo, ON
14.7 22.3 52%
Ottawa, ON 14.5 21.2 46%
Gatineau, QC 12.3 17.7 44%
Guelph, ON 18.8 26.0 39%
Greater Sudbury, ON 16.5 22.6 37%
St. John’s, NL 16.2 20.8 28%
Winnipeg, MB 24.0 30.3 26%
Vancouver, BC 11.1 14.0 26%
All CMAs 13.7 17.7 29%
Rate is based on 100,000 annual population.
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“In Service: 10-8”
Sign-up Now
Are you interested in regularly receiving the In 
Service: 10-8 newsletter by email. You can sign 
up by clicking here and then clicking on the 
“Sign up” link:
This “Sign up” link will take you to the free 
Subscription Form that only requires an email. 
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BACHELOR OF LAW ENFORCEMENT STUDIES
BACHELOR OF EMERGENCY & SECURITY MANAGEMENT
Expand your academic credentials and enhance your career options. 
Gain the theoretical background, applied skills and specialized 
knowledge for a career in public safety.
keeping communities safe
enforcing the law
on the front line
Apply today. JIBC.ca 604.528.5590    register@jibc.ca 
715 McBride Boulevard, New Westminster, BC
Be the one
Volume 18 Issue 6 ~ November/December 2018
PAGE 59
Upcoming Investigation & Enforcement Skills Courses
To register for any of the following courses, click on the course code below or contact the JIBC 
Registration Office at 604.528.5590 or 1.877.528.5591 (toll free). You can check Ways to Register for 
other registration methods and for assistance from the registration office. View the full 2019 Course 
Calendar online for a full list of upcoming Investigation & Enforcement Skills courses in 2019.
UPCOMING ONLINE COURSES  
January 16-February 13, 2019
Internet Open Source Investigations (INVE-1022)
February 20-March 27, 2019
Introduction to Administrative Law (INVE-1002)
April 10-May 8, 2019
Internet Open Source Investigations (INVE-1022)
UPCOMING COURSES IN NEW 
WESTMINSTER  
February 4-6, 2019
Introduction to the Criminal Law (INVE-1001) 
February 11-15, 2019
Enhanced Investigative Interviewing (INVE-1004) 
February 25-27, 2019
Report Writing for Professional Investigators (INVE-1005) 
March 6-20, 2019
Introduction to Administrative Law (INVE-1002) 
UPCOMING COURSES IN VICTORIA
January 14-18, 2019
Enhanced Investigative Interviewing (INVE-1004)
February 11-15, 2019
Introduction to Investigative Skills and Processes 
(INVE-1003)
April 29-30, 2019
Introduction to the Criminal Justice System 
(INVE-1003)
Apply for the Investigation & 
Enforcement Skills Certificate
Complete the Investigation & Enforcement Skills Certificate, 
an academic credential that can help you pursue or 
advance your in the field of investigation, enforcement and 
public safety. Many people who have completed the 
requirements for the certificate have gone on to a variety of 
rewarding careers. Apply online today. For more 
information, visit the Investigation & Enforcement Skills 
Certificate 
webpage.
15-007
Online Graduate  
Certificate Programs
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS 
TACTICAL CRIMINAL ANALYSIS
Expand your credentials and advance your career with 
these online graduate certificates. Learn through real world 
challenges, current cases, curriculum and techniques. 
Gain the specialized theoretical foundation and applied skills 
to function successfully as an analyst.
604.528.5843 JIBC.ca/graduatestudies
715 McBride Boulevard, New Westminster, BC
